

THE IMPLICATION OF EMERGING SECURITY THREATS ON CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Much of what has been written about civil-military relations in the United States seems to be reactive to present and past events rather than proactive and forward looking. Many of America's attempts to fine tune the course of civil-military relationships have been like steering a ship by observing its wake. What needs to occur in order to gain a resolution of this problem is for a proactive assessment of where America's society and military need to balance in a future security environment. What this entails is to first survey the current model that most resembles where civil-military relations stand now. Essentially, an examination will show that the military still embraces Huntington, while in reality Janowitz's theories are proving themselves to be the more applicable and accurate of the two. Especially noteworthy is the destruction of Huntington's myth that only the military has the professional knowledge to become involved in the waging of war.

Next, a comprehensive assessment of what the emerging security threats will be in the future is needed. This assessment is not intended to be all-inclusive, but it will serve as a comprehensive survey of probable sources of conflict in the future security environment. What this survey demonstrates is that modern warfare in the information age will be significantly different from that of previous times. The line between combatants and noncombatants will become even more blurred. The notion of what really is a safe and secure area will change drastically. The ability to determine where attacks originate from, who is responsible for the prosecution of attack, and how to best retaliate may all be significantly degraded. Furthermore, many of the advantages that America has enjoyed up to

this point may well be lost in the future. Because of the curious logic of the information age, it is likely that America will sell their adversaries comparable lethality, at least in certain areas. Given an accurate picture of the future security environment and where civil-military relationships stand now, it should be possible to anticipate some of the major future issues within this environment, and propose proactive solutions to them. The major challenges in this future scenario will be for America's military and America's society to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the new balance dictated by these emerging threats. Many of these threats cannot be met with solutions that rely solely upon the application of violence. Some of these new threats can only be resolved through diplomacy. Other threats will have to be understood in terms of the danger that they pose to America's heartland.

These new issues must be examined before they are elevated to the level of a crisis, and this means that the military will have to change many of the ways that goes about business. They must reject many of the insular traditions that have built up since World War II. While it is true that the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) has served to aid in the isolation of the military, this trend must also be fought. Only if the military can succeed in establishing a more open dialog with the American society at large will they succeed in guaranteeing America's security in the future. The most fundamental impact on the future of civil-military relationships will be from the change in the role of the individual. Because individuals make up both society and the military, the empowerment of the individual will necessitate significant changes in both components. Ultimately, this new environment may introduce more tension into the civil-military relationship. This tension would come not from a military is more threatening to society, but rather from a military that is unable to effectively communicate their security concerns to society. It possible that as individuals in the military

become more empowered that this trend will change. We have already seen this occur with regards to certain issues that concern the military. Ultimately, both the military and society will have to master new challenges if they hope to continue a fruitful relationship.

CHAPTER 2

MODELS OF CURRENT CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

There are a variety of models that can be examined when discussing civil-military relationships. While each has its own arguments and point of view, there is some common ground in the debate. Most agree that the civil-military relationship is one built upon a pair of forces. First is the imperative of the military to be structured to meet any perceived threat to national security. A military that cannot perform its security function is of no value to the nation that it serves. Second is the requirement to meet the needs of society. Huntington notes that each nation's security and societal needs are different.¹ He suggests that it may actually be impossible for some nations to achieve a stable security balance, because the requirements of their military are unacceptable to the nation's society. However, most societies can and do achieve their own unique balance between themselves and their military. For the most part, there exists an acceptable spectrum within both of the imperatives, and a balance is established within the spectrum.

Within the understanding that each society must develop its own unique balance between its security requirements and societal needs are a variety of notions of how to achieve a solution. A major influence on these notions is, as Huntington puts it, a balance of authority, influence and ideology.²

¹ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* page viii.

² Ibid.

What I will first examine in this chapter are Huntington's basic tenets, and second, Janowitz's argument that these tenets must change in response to the changes that have happened to society and the nature of warfare because of changes in technology. It is important to understand that Huntington and Janowitz agree that military and civil cultures are different. However, they disagree on whether or not these cultures ought to be different to the extent that they are.

A Review of Huntington

Huntington is probably the most noted thinker in the area of the relationship between a nation's military and its society. Huntington argues in his book *The Soldier and the State* that the modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional man.³⁴ Professionalism, he says, distinguishes the military officer of today from the warriors of previous ages. He says, "The existence of the officer corps as a professional body gives a unique cast to the modern problem of civil-military relations".⁵ Clearly, this is true. Unlike previous times, the modern officer corps maintains a far different relationship with society because he (the officer) is a professional, and maintains himself above partisan politics. This can obviously be contrasted with a variety of other nations, where the overt support of the military is required in order to gain and maintain power.

Huntington starts out by arguing that a profession has three distinguishing characteristics: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. He then explains how each of

³³ For the purposes of this paper, "man" will be considered a genderless term that will be used to refer to both sexes.

⁴ Ibid., 7.

⁵ Ibid.

these characteristics applies to the military profession. Huntington argues that “a distinct sphere of military competence does exist which is common to all or almost all, officers which distinguishes them from all, or almost all, civilians.” He says that this central skill can best be summed up in the phrase “the management of violence”.⁶ He further argues that it is neither a craft nor an art. Instead, it is “an extraordinarily complex intellectual skill requiring comprehensive study and training”.⁷ The implication here is that only military officers are sufficiently well trained to conduct and/or manage modern warfare.

Huntington argues that the responsibility of the officer is the military security of his client, society.⁸ Huntington says that while all members of society have an interest in security, “the officer corps alone is responsible for military security to the exclusion of all other ends”.⁹ Again, a subtext of the argument is an attempt to establish boundaries, more in the interest of fencing out civil authorities than of fencing in the military.

One of the other key points that Huntington argues against is “fusionism”. He acknowledges that political and military policies are much more closely interrelated after World War II than they were previously. However, Huntington believes that it is still possible and necessary to maintain the distinction between political and military functions at the highest levels of government.¹⁰ He is not alone in this view. Many feel that military involvement in any political issues will place them on a slippery slope toward participation in partisan politics.

⁶ Ibid., 11.

⁷ Ibid., 13.

⁸ Ibid., 15.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., 351.

Huntington argues that the knowledge required to serve in the military profession cannot be achieved in any way other than careful study. His thesis is that the profession of officership focuses on the management of violence. The security of the nation is something that is completely dependent upon the military. Given the military's unique role in providing security to society, Huntington argues that the profession of the military must be responsive only to the security environment. Because the security environment is almost independent of society, the military can avoid all issues that are not security related. Huntington believes that the military must avoid becoming involved in politics at all costs.¹¹ This summarizes Huntington's notion of the relationship between the civil and military sectors. Much of what he argues has merit under certain circumstances, but changes in the security environment make the practice of his theories unrealistic. Huntington does an excellent job of defining the responsibilities of the military to society, yet he fails to anticipate the impact of new technology on the critical civil-military balance.

Summary of Janowitz

Janowitz has developed a separate notion of how the military should interact with society while functioning as guarantor of their security. In his book *The Professional Soldier*, he sets out to examine the relationship between the military and society. Not necessarily with the same goal as Huntington, but rather to establish its condition and its trends. While he does not argue that Huntington was off base in his theory, he does point out that changes in technology have necessitated changes in the military. If, as Huntington argues, civil-military relationships are ultimately about finding a balance between the authoritative, influential and

¹¹ Ibid., 350 – 354.

ideological needs of the two components, then it follows that the military cannot remain rigidly ignorant of the political ramifications of their actions.

Janowitz argued in 1971 that five basic hypotheses must be used to correctly analyze the changes to the modern military that have occurred in the last 50 years.¹² With these five hypotheses Janowitz argues that the military has evolved from Huntington's proposed basic model to something which is necessarily much more political.

His first hypothesis is that organizational authority is changing.¹³ The military has become much less reliant on authoritarian domination and is shifting to persuasion and group consensus. Janowitz argues it is because "the central concern of commanders is no longer the enforcement of rigid discipline, but rather the maintenance of high levels of initiative and morale."¹⁴ It is the technical character of modern warfare that has brought about this change. Contrary to previous times, "an important element of power resides with each soldier"¹⁵ and therefore different methods rather than pure authoritarianism must motivate them.¹⁶

The second hypothesis that Janowitz develops is that of a narrowing skill differential between military and civilian elites. He analyzes data to demonstrate that the number of "purely military" occupational specialties have fallen from more than 90 percent in the Civil

¹² Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* Page 7.

¹³ Ibid., 8.

¹⁴ Ibid., 9.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ For the radical extension of where this may lead, see: "Defense of Fomblor's Ford" In it is described the tactics, equipment and doctrine of the American Army in 2010. Even while engaged in combat, the soldiers are generally linked by radio and computer; there is little of the traditional Infantry "Follow Me!" that characterized previous conflicts. The leadership skills would be very different for this kind of force.

War to less than 30 percent after Korea. The most important issue surrounding this change is that military officers must now possess many more of the same skill sets as their civilian counterparts. Additionally, Janowitz argues that military commanders must develop a greater political awareness, and a capacity for public relations. The military is now facing many issues that are not uniquely in their domain, but rather have much in common with civilians.¹⁷ Many components of the modern military machine are decidedly indistinguishable from the comparable civil job. Tasks such as supplying logistics, managing personnel and conducting public relations are virtually the same with the exception that the military man wears a uniform.

Janowitz's third hypothesis is that there has been a shift in officer recruiting. He argues that the officers currently serving in the military are much more reflective of society as a whole than those for previous times. Traditionally, officership was generally reserved for the elite. However, he suggests that the democratization of entrance can potentially weaken the democratization of behavior.¹⁸ His argument is that the previously elite officers gained prestige from their peer group. As officers are no longer gaining this prestige from their elite peers, they now seek it from the public as a whole. This search for prestige by the officer makes him more obtrusive and places a strain on normal civil-military relationships.¹⁹ In the officer's quest for validation, he becomes more involved with issues that were formerly taboo to the military.

¹⁷ Ibid., 10.

¹⁸ Ibid., 10-11.

¹⁹ Ibid., 11.

The fourth hypothesis that Janowitz puts forward has to do with military career patterns. He argues that in order to reach the highest levels of the military, technical competence must be emphasized. However, once they have achieved this high level they must have the ability to be innovative and adaptive. Because these two requirements are somewhat contradictory, Janowitz suggests that studying the career development of military officers may explain how and why the top-level officers behave the way that they do.²⁰

The final hypothesis that Janowitz puts forward is the trend in political indoctrination. Janowitz argues that in the past the military has been criticized for having a "military mind". This was characterized as a lack of inventiveness, an inclination toward ultra-nationalism, ethnocentrism, and as being a disciplinarian.²¹ The steps that the military has taken to meet this criticism have also supplied military officers with a variety of political, social and economic opinions. This proves to be a Catch-22 for the military officer. On the one hand, he is required to be more politically astute, both in the execution of his military duties and in his policy recommendations. On the other hand, he is required to remain above politics, and not get involved with political issues. President Kennedy observes in a speech at West Point: "The non-military problems which you will face will also be the most demanding... diplomatic, political, and economic issues... and to fulfill a broader role-- as a compliment to our diplomacy-- as an arm of our diplomacy..."²² "Since the end of World War II military officers have been asked to perform an increasing number of political roles. In the rebuilding of Germany and Japan they were asked to oversee economic and social programs, to act as

²⁰ Ibid., 11-12.

²¹ Ibid., 13.

²² Kennedy, the New York Times, 7 June 1962 page 26.

ambassadors and even negotiate with foreign governments.²³ Ultimately, all of the additional tasks required the military officer to become more politically astute. The change in the security environment has necessarily brought about this change in the military, and the dangers of its unwelcome side effects.

Janowitz believed that the military should integrate with society. He believed that they should become more aware of society's views, and reflect them in their structure and conduct, and argued that they're doing it now. Janowitz says that security is the business of the nation, not an esoteric need that is provided by the military and beyond the question of civilian leadership and society as a whole. Janowitz's point is well taken. Just because military operations are complex does not rule out effect of civilian oversight in control. There has always been a belief encouraged by the military, that civilian oversight is best when it is least. One popular argument is that Vietnam was lost because of over-controlling politicians. A more careful examination of this issue will yield a very different answer.

The Two Models Compared

When these two points of view are examined, it becomes clear that although Huntington's model may have been appropriate to a certain degree in past times, the reality of the information age now eliminates it as a viable model. While it is true that civil-military relations can be defined as a balance between the nation's society and a nation's military, it is also true that the two entities cannot exist autonomously. Huntington implies that the business of the management of violence is something that military officers are uniquely qualified for and is not under any circumstances, something which civilians are capable of.

²³ Slater, military officers and politics one page 1 – 12.

History does not support this notion. Finally, Huntington argues against what he calls fusionism, which is the interaction of military and civilian policy makers on a political level. With the benefit of 40 years of hindsight, we can now see how futile this proposal is. Keeping the military above any sort of partisan politics remains a vital and valid pursuit. However, because politics is about the allocation of resources, restricting them from input in this area is hopeless.

Almost 20 years ago Samuel Huntington described the concept of "fusionism," the theory that military considerations could not be realistically separated from political ones. One author comments: "Today fusionism is almost universally accepted as mere truism by military men and civilians alike."²⁴

The problems with Huntington's model mainly lies with his assumptions. First, Huntington fails to address Clausewitz's notion that war is an extension of politics by other means. While Huntington argues that officers should remain apolitical, he fails to address the argument that the application of violence is normally a political act, or at least has political ramifications. Others who have looked at the issue argue, "Military professionals must fully accept the fact that military force can only be a means to an end, and that end is, in the final analysis, the eventual resolution of some political problem . . ."²⁵

Huntington's notion of a proper civil-military relationship is for society to tell the military what the end state of a conflict should be and to allow the military to determine how to achieve this goal. This completely ignores all the political issues involved in the

²⁴ Jerome Slater, *Military Officers and Politics I* page 751.

²⁵ Bletz, "Military Professionalism," Pages 16 – 17.

application of violence. Kennedy observes" Some {of you} will negotiate terms of a cease-fire, with broad political as well as military ramifications."²⁶ Depending on the strategy used by the military, it is possible that more harm than good can be achieved.²⁷ If the military's strategy is perceived to be waged against the people of a country rather than their political apparatus, it is likely that America's stature would suffer internationally. Furthermore, the methods that America's military uses must be synchronized with the nation's political rhetoric. This is an example of why military officers must at least be aware of the political implications of their military actions at the international level. One proponent of the military's involvement with politics argues:

Politics is the allocation of resources and this allocation requires decision-making. Without a solid understanding of the impact of decision-making, it is likely that the best decisions will not be made. The military must be involved because they are uniquely qualified to describe the resources and costs demanded by available strategic alternatives.²⁸

On the domestic level, military officers are no less involved in politics whether they wish it or not. The fact is that any military strategy that they recommend translates into different economic patterns for the nation. If they focus on building a strong Navy, coastal states will benefit disproportionately from the military spending. If they focus on a strong Army, states with large military bases and states with extensive manufacturing will benefit the most. Even issues such as building wheeled vehicles rather than tracked vehicles have political implications for those states involved in their manufacturing.

²⁶ Consider the foresight of this prediction in light of Schwartzkopf's role after the Gulf War. His decision to allow the Iraqis to fly helicopters in the no Fly zone ultimately ended in the Massacre of thousands of Kurds, taking much of the glow from the American victory.

²⁷ The Military walked a very fine line when prosecuting its war on the Iraqis. Any appearance that they acted out of racial or religious motivations could have been very detrimental to their goals.

²⁸ Garrison, "Military Officers and Politics II" page 765.

How the Army chooses to train has political implications. If the Army focuses exclusively on threats such as large Soviet style militaries, they will be ill prepared to conduct humanitarian missions that an administration may favor. If the administration then sends them to do a humanitarian mission, it is likely, or at least possible, that there would be political repercussions from their poor performance on international and domestic levels. To argue that military officers must remain outside of politics is to ignore the political implications of almost every action of the military. This is not to argue that military officers should become politically active. Rather, the military should focus on doing their mission for their civilian leadership regardless of how they personally feel about the action. They must focus on avoiding any appearance of partisanship.

Probably Huntington's greatest failure is in his inability to see the logical extension of his argument. Since he argues that civil-military relationships are a unique balance between each society and its military, then he must accept that this balance changes as society changes. This, I think, is precisely the point that Janowitz makes with his five working hypotheses. The reality of the necessity to change the civil-military balance can be seen today. Society has changed, and so has the military, both having come under the influence of the new technologies in the information age. Because of this, the military must develop new approaches to guaranteeing national security. One of the major challenges that the military faces is a blurring in the distinction between political and military operations. This may well bring about previously unacceptable levels of risk and previously unwanted levels of involvement by the military. How the military and society deal with this change will undoubtedly have a profound impact on the results.

The Military Without Oversight

One of the other implications of Huntington's construct of civil-military relations is that the application of violence should be something left solely to the military. Huntington implies that once violence has been decided upon as a course of action it should then be left up to the military as to how best to accomplish the mission. A common perception among the military and among most civilians is that only the military is qualified to best determine strategic matters in the application of violence. Perhaps this was the case before the concept of total warfare came into being, when the actions of the military were more uniquely martial and less intertwined with politics than they are today. However, history shows us that this idea, while it is intuitively attractive, is wrong.

History holds many examples where civilian leaders rose to the occasion and stopped the military from making decisions that now, in retrospect, would have been decidedly wrong. Cohen notes two historical examples of a broken civil-military relationship when he comments: "Indeed, it is precisely those cases in which the military has had the freest hand -- Germany in World War I and Japan in World War II -- that have produced the greatest ruin to a state."²⁹

Probably one of the best known examples of a decision made by a civilian, against the wishes of the military, is the Cuban missile crisis. Throughout the buildup of tension during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the military was adamant about the need to attack Cuba, and thus likely start a war with the Soviet Union. The degree to which they advocated an attack is astonishing, as Slater notes: "In the Cuban missile crisis the JCS[Joint Chiefs of Staff]

²⁹ Cohen, *The Unequal Dialog : The Civil- Military Gap and the Use of Force* page 13.

pressed hard for a direct military attack on Cuba, even after it appeared that the blockade was succeeding.”³⁰

If it had not been for the remarkably strong leadership of President Kennedy at that time, this may well have been the course of action that would have been taken. In retrospect, a nuclear war would not have been in the best interest of anyone. Clearly, Kennedy's demand for an alternative solution proved to be the correct choice of action even though it flew in the face of all military recommendations. One is inevitably led to wonder if the military viewed it as an opportunity to attack, rather than a necessity. If ever there were a scenario that favored a more balanced education for military officers, this was it.

Other compelling examples exist. History tells us time and again that a military without proper oversight will make fatal errors. Cohen notes, however, this is not the only problem that civil authority must guard against when dealing with the military. Additionally, civilian leadership must sometimes prod the military into action. Historical studies show that Churchill was much more active during World War II than what was originally perceived. He played a vital role in questioning assumptions that the British military made in regard to German capabilities during war games of a homeland invasion. Because of the British military's assumptions, they were precluded from taking any offensive action. Churchill, however, demonstrated that many of the British military's assumptions and estimates were overly cautious.³¹ On more than one occasion, he delved into the details of a plan and determined, contrary to his generals' opinion, that the risk was not as great as assumed, and was worth taking.

³⁰ Jerome Slater, *Military Officers and Politics I* page 752.

³¹ Cohen, *The Unequal Dialogue : The Civil- Military Gap and the Use of Force* page 28.

Likewise, Lincoln played a substantial role in the formulation of the strategy of the North in the American Civil War. The commonly held view is that Lincoln's major contribution to winning the Civil War was his ability to finally select the correct general (Grant). This case would seem to support Huntington's view that war is a business best left solely to military professionals. However, a more careful study shows that Lincoln did much more than just place his faith in military leadership. Cohen notes that Lincoln's first task was to try to discern which among his generals was fit to lead the North.³² Each had personal traits and military qualities that were questionable. "None of these military leaders were perfect: all made mistakes from rashness (Grant at Cold Harbor) or caution (Sherman in the Atlantic campaign) and late in the war as well as early. They were, in short, as fallible as their counterparts today."³³

Even after Lincoln put Grant in charge he continued to monitor him closely through the correspondence of Charles Dana, a former New York Tribune reporter. Dana became Assistant Secretary of War, (under Stanton) and kept Lincoln apprised of his field generals in a surprisingly straightforward tone. After observing Rosecrans at the battle of Chattanooga he wrote: "Under the present circumstances I consider this army to be very unsafe in his hands; but do know of no man except Thomas who could now be safely put in this place."³⁴

³² *Ibid.*, 18.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Charles Dana to E.M.Stanton, 12 October 1863, OR Series I, Vol.XXX, Ptl, p.215.

Through these reports Lincoln kept a far closer eye on the military's conduct than was commonly thought. Probably one of the most telling letters is one in which he wrote to Grant about his concern for the conduct of the Union Army in August of 1864.

I have seen your despatch [sic] in which you say 'I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself South of the enemy, and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also.' This, I think, is exactly right, as to how our forces should move. But please look over the despatches [sic] you may have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here, of 'putting our army South of the enemy' war of following him to the death' in any direction. I repeat to you it will neither be done nor attempted unless you watched every day, and hour, and force it.³⁵

The only conclusion that can be drawn after reading this dispatch from Lincoln to Grant is that President Lincoln was much more involved in the conduct of the North than is traditionally thought. Rather than just appointing Grant and trusting in him, Lincoln took a surprisingly active role. Throughout the course of the war, Lincoln monitored Grant and providing guidance and input as necessary in order to keep the campaigns on their correct paths.

What is demonstrated by the previous examples is the absolute need for civilian oversight of the military, not just, as Huntington implies, during times of peace. By examining what exactly goes wrong when the military is left on their own, it is obvious that problems arise that require the attention of civilian leadership. I will later show that this specific issue of civilian involvement of defense planning is something that will need to increase in the future.

Conclusion

After examining the contributions of Huntington and Janowitz, several things become evident. Undoubtedly, there is a balance achieved by every society with their military.

³⁵ Abraham Lincoln to Ulysses S. Grant, 3 August 1864, in Basler, ed., Works, Vol. VII, p. 476.

Typically, that military is made up of professionals dedicated to the defense of their society. However, it is also evident that fusionism is a fact of life. While it is impossible for modern military officers to remain outside of politics, it is still within the realm of possibility for them to remain above partisan politics. Additionally, contrary to what Huntington would argue, it is clear that the military actually requires a certain degree of civilian oversight of their conduct. One way to sum up the difference between the military and the diplomats is simply this: "The military gets paid to be pessimists, and diplomats gets paid to be optimists".³⁶ What this essentially means in terms of civil-military relations is that each side needs the other. The military is incomplete without its civilian leadership, and civilian leadership is incomplete without its military. I am not arguing that society could effectively fight a conflict without professional military officers. Rather, each brings special attributes to the civil-military dynamic.

As we move in to the information age, some new challenges come to light, which make the quality and conduct of civil-military relations even more critical. Security that was previously taken for granted is rapidly disappearing, and unless the military and society come to terms with this changing reality it is likely that they will encounter a cruel lesson in the next conflict. In the next portion of this paper I will examine some of the critical issues and misconceptions which currently surround the notion of security in the United States. Until these future issues are recognized and addressed, is quite possible that civil-military relations will continue to degrade.

³⁶ This was a common explanation we used to explain our differences to the State Department at the Defense Attaché Office in the American Embassy, Bucharest Romania.

CHAPTER 3

THE IMPACT OF THE INFORMATION AGE

The information age has a variety of impacts on civil - military relations. It has definitely changed the perception of society as to the reality of combat and the ability of the military. This is not to say that it has changed for the better. In fact, the military's careful information management of the Gulf War has established standards that will likely be unobtainable in future conflicts.³⁷ The information age serves to inform the civilian population about other non-security (humanitarian) issues. This awareness precipitates an inclination to "do something". It has drastically changed the skill-set that the military needs to possess, and necessitates some changes both in terms of the management of violence and broadening of political understanding in the military, if they are to meet the challenges of this new threat environment. In short, the information age has changed the authority, influence and ideology on both sides of the civil-military equation, much as Janowitz predicted some 30 years ago. One of the key issues to examine is the across-the-board changes to the security environment. Fortress America is no more, and much of the military's responsibilities now focus on threats that were previously unheard of and unanticipated.

Emerging Threats

There are a variety of emerging threats in the information age. Some are a result of the application of new technology. Others are merely occurring at this time and are not a product

³⁷ See for example Ricks *On American Soil* and Cohen: *the Unequal Dialog*.

of the information age. None the less, this new spectrum of emerging threats will need to be addressed by the military, and an understanding will have to be reached between the military and the civil society with regards to several aspects. Three prominent issues are military preparedness, the trade off between civil liberties and security, and the exact nature of the threat.³⁸

The information age is bringing about a variety of unprecedented changes that dramatically impact the security environment in previously unanticipated ways. First I will examine a previous change and its impact on American national security policy, so that we can gain a certain understanding of the potential impact of some of the emerging threats that may challenge future national security. Then I will conduct a cursory survey of emerging security threats, and finally, note some of the implications and what they mean in terms of national security policy and hence, civil-military relations.

When one considers the current world situation, and wonders whether or not new threats have an impact on the current security environment, it is only necessary to look at some trends and analyze them. In the past, changes in the world security environment took place at a slower rate, and gave the international system more time to adapt to them. Even then, there were times when changes in technology nearly spelled disaster as the world looked for a reasonable understanding of how to deal with the new security environment. This understanding of the new security environment was not one gained solely by blindly following military experts, but rather through the combined effort of diplomatic and military initiatives.

³⁸ The information provided in this chapter is essentially a summary of an emerging security threats class that I took with Professor John A. Battilega at the University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies in the fall term of year 2000.

Nuclear weapons are an example of an adjustment that the world went through that demonstrated what new challenges can mean to a state's security. After they were established as a viable weapon, they were first embraced as "just another weapon in the arsenal". Entire war-fighting strategies were designed around them, and virtually everyone, both civilians and military, accepted the notion of "Limited Nuclear Warfare". When one reads the literature of the time, the thinking is incompatible to our current way of viewing nuclear weapons. The culmination of this bankrupt policy came during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the world was only hours from a full-scale nuclear war.³⁹ After that crisis was narrowly averted, the use of nuclear weapons was rethought, and they became a weapon of last resort. Other safeguards, such as the hotline between Washington and Moscow, were put into place as a direct result of the new realization that nuclear weapons could not be used. Even though the nuclear buildup continued on both sides, the notion of acceptable use for the weapon became much more restrictive. This is an example of the progression of thought that takes place when a change occurs in the structure of the international security system.

In terms of what nuclear weapons meant to national security, one need only look at the notion of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), to see that very basic assumptions of national security were fundamentally changed by their introduction. MAD was a doctrine of allowing a nation's population to be held hostage by the enemy, and thereby achieving a stand off. The American people had to accept that they were no longer safe, and that at any time the nuclear arms of enemies could kill them. The fundamental contract between the military and the nation had to be mentally altered, from "provide security" to "do the best

³⁹ An interesting side note is that the military wanted to fight, and it was the civilians who exercised restraint. A lesson that should be learned from this is that the military may not be unique in their ability to deal with emerging threats, even if they claim it as their province.

they could to provide security". Americans suddenly found themselves digging bomb shelters to make up for inadequacies in the military. It is noteworthy that the nation accepted this new contract without clamoring for some other military measure to restore their former security. This portends well for emerging threats that may soon challenge the national security balance in the same fundamental way that nuclear weapons did in the past.

Because of the dangers presented when the world deals with new realities and threats, one need only look at the plethora of emerging security threats in order to arrive at the conclusion that it is very likely that overall security will decrease for the average citizen. These emerging threats are endangering much of the security that America currently takes for granted. Many new security threats are emerging, and they do have the potential of impacting the security environment in new and unanticipated ways. Each of the threats can be analyzed on its merits, or the conclusion can be reached based on the fact that transition means change, and systems that are in the process of changing are usually more volatile and dangerous than those that are in a state of equilibrium.⁴⁰ Regardless, this change in threats will necessitate a change in civil-military relations, possibly to an even greater degree than the introduction of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were controllable, and they were limited to a small group of legitimate governments. Some of the new threats may well be pandemic, not only uncontrollable in their proliferation but also untraceable in their use.

An additional factor that increases the instability of the changing security environment is globalization, and the transition into the information age. Technology spreads prolifically throughout the system, and in contrast to the past, the world has only a few short years to deal with new issues, not decades. The speed of these changes is another catalyst to increase

⁴⁰ For an extensive argument on the current stability of the international system, see Rosenau, *Turbulent Change* Pages 459-467.

the volatility of the world system. Simply put, new issues spread like wildfire, and are felt worldwide within a very short period of time. This is a critical issue because globalization impacts both ends of the civil-military balance. With changes happening so quickly, acceptable equilibrium is more difficult to achieve. Examples of this can be seen in how totalitarian governments deal with populations who suddenly change their point of view because of increased amounts of information that they receive. Before the government can sufficiently modify its behavior to deal with the changed expectations of the population, violence breaks out.⁴¹

When looking at the emerging security threats it is possible to see a variety of very dangerous issues on the horizon. As each of these issues is analyzed, it becomes apparent that not only do many of them have the potential and volatility to have a significant impact on the entire global system, but that it is almost inevitable that some of them will. It is almost certain that some of these issues will have a detrimental impact on the national security balance in the US and some of them will foment new global dangers. These dangers will demand changes in U.S. security policy, some of which may have societal impacts in the United States.

Precision Strike and its Implications

One of the first emerging threats that should be analyzed is precision weaponry. It is dangerous for a number of reasons. First, it has given American society the illusion that wars can be fought in new ways that alleviate most of the bloodshed and collateral damage.

⁴¹ I would argue that Tienanmen Square is just such a case. The relationship between the Chinese government and the people changed so rapidly that violence broke out. The Government could not change rapidly enough to meet the new demands of the people.

Without the specter of bloodshed and collateral damage to deter nations from going to war, it is more likely that the state will more willingly turn to the military option for conflict resolution. However, this does not mean that, in fact, wars will be free of those previous horrors. Dissolution will result from two unreasonable expectations being placed upon the military. First, society believes that the military can conduct war upon a nation's government and avoid conducting war upon a nation's people. This is not the case. War still rides with the other three horsemen. Secondly, society believes that the military can conduct war without taking casualties of their own. The Gulf War sent the wrong message in this respect because the next war will most likely be much more costly. Luttwak suggests that recent events have "heightened and intensified what are basically unrealistic expectations".⁴²

From precision weaponry arises the strategy of decapitation. This introduces instability into the international system because it makes first strike a more attractive option. Precision strike essentially changes or brings into question some of the previous "concrete" rules regarding warfare. Countries can no longer operate under the assumption that specific individuals and critical pieces of national infrastructure can be made safe. Instead, even a minimal amount of precision strike conventional weapons can have the potential of dealing a fatal blow.⁴³ As more countries gain this capability, it may well shift the perceived advantage from defense to offense, making the world potentially more volatile. If in fact it does shift the advantage to the offense, then there's bound to be a tension that develops

⁴² Congress lacks Warriors in Ranks, *Insight on the News*, page 3 August 1999 Michael Rust and Sean Paige.

⁴³ See "The Revolution in Military Affairs," Chapter 3, at <http://www.airpower.Maxwell.af.Mil/airchronicles/battle/chp3.html> Here the authors suggest that by the year 2020 it may be possible to strike 500 strategically important targets in the first minute of a campaign. Contrast this with the U.S. Eighth Air Force striking only 50 strategic targets in 1943.

between society and the military, as the military pushes for quicker action in times of crisis and society continues to embrace violence as a last resort.⁴⁴

The Problem of Space

The use of space is another area that can bring about instability. As more and more countries become dependent on satellite assets not only for intelligence gathering but also for communication, the potential for conflict increases. Just as we had a nuclear arms race, the potential for a race in space still exists. In much the same way that Anti-anti-ballistic missiles (AABMs) would counter Anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) and so forth, satellites could be countered by anti-satellite systems and they could be countered by anti-anti-satellite systems. Other issues with weapons in space are: What constitutes an attack? What if another satellite is put in a blocking position and degrades a satellite's performance? What if it merely approaches another satellite? Is there sovereign territory in space? Does this territory extend in line of sight between terrestrial based stations and satellites? Who will determine answers to these questions and what does it mean to national security?⁴⁵

Space warfare is especially problematic because many space assets are co-owned by a number of nations. Even without the entangling alliances that brought about World War I, it is easy to imagine a scenario where a third party country is dragged into a war because of the

⁴⁴ Metz, Steve. "Armed Conflict in the 21st Century: the Information Revolution and Post Modern Warfare", page 74.

⁴⁵ for an excellent summary of space related issues see:

John B. Sheldon, "Space as the Fourth Environment: For Warfare or a Support Role?" RUSI Journal, October, 1999 Pp. 51-56.

See also Dr. Xavier Pasco "The Transformation of Space: From Peripheral Asset to Core Capability?" RUSI Journal, October, 1999 Pp. 43-46.

See also LTG Donald G. Cook, "Congreve's Red Glare. . . Reflections of the Past, Visions of the Future" RUSI Journal, October, 1999 Pp. 38-42.

systematic destruction of its co-owned space assets by another country. What will the U.S. policy be in relation to these issues? Will the policy handicap the military in the interest of minimizing the impact of the conflict on the international community? Or will the policy focus only on "military necessity" and possibly expand the conflict? As of right now, there are no weapons in space. If this changes, how will society feel about being able to actually see a weapon pointed at them when they look into the sky?

Missile Defense

Another emerging technology that is upsetting the status quo is that of missile defense. Up to this point, the world has dealt with nuclear weapons by using the principal of MAD. The new technology of missile defense makes the old balance no longer viable. Many believe that missile defense as it is currently presented is without merit. The United States claims that this defense is only to protect against an attack by a rogue nation using a few missiles, and that nations such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea will have such a capability by 2005.⁴⁶ The fact is, however, that there are many easier ways to deliver a weapon of mass destruction to a city in the United States than putting it on a ballistic missile. What this technology essentially does is introduce a new round of spending mandates to a nuclear club whose members cannot afford to meet the requirement. The implication of these nations being unable to make the spending requirements of missile defense is that we will now have a number of nuclear powers facing a new level of insecurity. Insecurity within the nuclear club is never a sought after trait for a stable and safe world. Equally troubling is the message that is being sent to the American public. With these vast expenditures taking place, they

⁴⁶ Donald Rumsfeld et al, *Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States*, July 15, 1998 Pp. 3-4.

will undoubtedly feel that a certain degree of security is being bought. Unfortunately, there are many ways of delivering a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD), and most of them are easier than a missile. It is likely that they will feel cheated when they realize just how little their money has bought.

Terrorism

The increased availability of information in the marketplace has made the terrorist a much more lethal adversary. Terrorists have demonstrated the ability to make both chemical and biological weapons. The breakup of the Soviet Union has also introduced additional knowledge about weapons of mass destruction into the marketplace. In fact, no one can be sure that some of the small nuclear weapons in the former Soviet arsenal have not found their way into the wrong hands. Additionally, as technology for advanced conventional weapons spreads throughout the international system, it is extremely probable that terrorists will have access to it. Scientists are talking about increasing the power of explosives by a factor of four to eight.⁴⁷ We have already seen what a van filled with fertilizer is capable of doing. Imagine an explosion eight times that powerful. This increase in the lethality of terrorists will definitely made the world a more dangerous place, and degrade the ability of the military to provide future security at it's current levels. One of the major issues is how to deal with this magnified threat. First, whose responsibility is the defense of the homeland? What if the attack originates from an offshore location? What civil liberties are Americans willing to give up in exchange for a more secure existence? As the lethality of terrorist weapons

⁴⁷ See Zeeve Bonen, "The Impact of Technological Developments on the Balance in the Middle East," in Zhlomo Gazit, editor, *The Middle East Military Balance*, 1993 - 1994, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv, (also Westview Press), 1994, Pp. 148 - 163.

continues to grow it seems likely that Americans will be induced to give up more of their civil liberties in exchange for security.

The Environment

In the past, The United States achieved its prominence by exploiting vast energy reserves and by putting environmental concerns in a decidedly secondary role. Now that the United States has achieved a high level of development it is beginning to focus more on environmental issues. Those countries that are not as far along in economic development see this as yet another attempt by the United States to keep them from realizing their full potential. While the United States was under development it gave little thought to pollution, the greenhouse effect, or the ozone layer. Now, however, the United States wants to tell emerging economies that they must observe additional environmental constraints while pursuing their economic development. This change of American policy will cause inevitable tension, and while it probably will not be the direct cause of conflict, it is likely that it will create additional motives for conflict. James Rosenau has identified three major sources of turbulence in the international system. Changes in the structure and size of population, availability and distribution of natural resources, and technology.⁴⁸ As each has some influence on the others, it is likely that all will play a prominent role in sparking conflict in the future. Will the military be called upon to play a more prominent role in environmental issues? Perhaps only in extreme circumstances, such as to stop a nation from polluting mutually shared environmental resources, such as air or water, with nuclear waste or the

⁴⁸ Rosenau, Turbulent Change Page 465.

toxic equivalent. As environmental security gains recognition as an issue this scenario gains credibility.⁴⁹

This is one aspect of the larger issue of dwindling resources. In the past, natural resources were thought to be virtually unlimited. The earth was thought to be so large that any amount of pollution could have almost no impact. Hazardous waste was dumped indiscriminately; pollution was poured into the atmosphere. Now, as we see a growing hole in the ozone layer, and an observable global warming trend, developed countries are taking steps to try to limit pollution. This results in a natural conflict between under developed nations who want to continue the practice and developed nations who want to stop it.

Energy will be one of the critical resources in the future. Because of its scarcity it is not difficult to view it as a catalyst for conflict. Two things are fairly evident at this point. The first is that a country cannot develop without adequate energy resources. The second is that there will not be enough resources to fulfill the energy requirements of everyone. Given this, it is easy to see why countries are already jockeying for position. China and India both recognize that they will need much greater quantities of energy than they now consume if they hope to complete their modernization. Conflict over resources will undoubtedly be a catalyst for future disagreements and will necessitate, to a certain degree, new strategic thinking. This, again, will bring about new realities for American society. The last time our energy resources were threatened, we took military action. Military action in the future will not always be a viable course of action.

⁴⁹ Mark J. Valencia, "Energy and Insecurity in Asia," *Survival*, Autumn 1997, Page.101 Notes that from 1978 to 1993 the Soviet and Russian Navy dumped 18 reactors and 13,150 containers of radioactive waste, mostly in the Sea of Japan. Japan's response was to warn that their relationship could crumble if this action continued.

In China's case, energy needs dictate that they focus both on the Pacific Rim as well as on the energy resources located in the former Soviet Republics in the Caspian region. Each of these locations has the potential to create new conflicts. China has claimed possession of the Spratly Islands in the Pacific Rim. These islands and the surrounding ocean are rich in mineral deposits and oil. The problem is that four or five other countries also have territorial claims to this area.⁵⁰ China has also focused new attention on former Soviet republics in the Caspian region. The problem there is not only the challenges in the transportation of the energy resource but also the Soviet hegemony in the region. In each of these locations that China has focused on to meet its energy needs, it has garnered distrust from the other states in the region. The other states see China as trying to establish itself as a regional hegemon.⁵¹

India has an equally large problem. With one billion inhabitants their need for energy resources will be huge. Currently, they get oil out of the Middle East. Their other resource for oil lies in the former Soviet Republics beyond Pakistan, a traditional enemy. This poses a significant problem. India and Pakistan have been in conflict for some time. India cannot afford to allow Pakistan to control its energy resources, and therefore must seek alternatives.⁵² As countries seek out resources, they will inevitably clash with others who

⁵⁰⁵⁰ **Spratly Islands**, group of more than 600 islets, coral reefs, sand bars, and atolls in the South China Sea. The islands are located to the northwest of Brunei, the Malaysian state of Sabah, and the Philippine island of Palawan. Ownership of some or all of the Spratlys is disputed between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The largest of the 12 main islets is Itu Aba, with a total area of 36 hectares (90 acres); none is permanently inhabited. Geological surveys indicate that the Spratlys lie atop vast oil and gas reserves, perhaps greater than any previously discovered. The islands also lie along important shipping lanes. (Microsoft Encarta2000, s.v. "Spratley Islands").

⁵¹ For a list of other disputed area in the region with hydrocarbon potential, see Mark J. Valencia, "Energy and Insecurity in Asia," *Survival*, Autumn 1997, Page 93.

⁵² For an excellent summary of India's energy dilemma, see Juli A. MacDonald and S. Enders Wimbush, "India's Energy Security," *Strategic Analysis*, August 1999, Pp.821-835.

would also like to control them. Insufficient energy resources will undoubtedly lead to conflict, not unlike in the past. However, as demand grows and resources dwindle it is clear that energy will become a critically strategic resource to every nation's security.

An additional natural resource which up until recently has been given little thought is water.⁵³ Throughout history there has generally been more than enough water available to those who needed it. Recently this has begun to change. More and more conflicts are rising over both the volume of water that arrives from upstream and the quality of water. In some cases water is diverted to irrigate land and enhance agricultural production in order to feed a growing population. In other cases industrial or agricultural production upstream degrades the quality of the water by polluting it. Pollution can be something as simple as heating the water when it is used by a nuclear power plant, or as complex as the issues involving heavy metals and animal waste. Whether the conflict arises from the quality or the quantity of water, it is clear that a growing world population means a growing demand for freshwater, and freshwater is a finite resource.⁵⁴ Until now, a nation's security has rarely depended on its access to freshwater. These new shortages serve as additional facets to a nation's security dilemma. The solution to this particular dilemma is not one that will likely be couched in terms such as "management of violence". Rather, concerted and united efforts on a regional level will likely be needed to resolve this issue. This does not mean that the solution will be easy. Even though water is a renewable resource, in several cases bitter rivals share aquifers, and water may well prove to be a catalyst for heightened tensions in the future.

⁵³ An excellent summary of this issue can be found in "Global Water Shortages: Roots of Future Conflict?," *Strategic Comments*, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, volume 5, issue 6, July 1999.

⁵⁴ Interestingly, Boutros Boutros-Ghali has written essays about the relationship between water conservation and political stability in Africa and the Middle East. (Microsoft Encarta, 2000) .

Information Warfare

Another major issue, which could lead to serious conflict, is that of strategic information warfare. While it is true that not everyone is in agreement as to whether or not strategic information warfare exists, the notion cannot be dismissed. Strategic information warfare can be characterized as attacks on a country's information system and measures taken to modify their perceptions. An example of this would be logic bombs designed to destroy computer systems, disrupting national power sources, or giving incorrect information to a nation's air defense system. Russia has given serious thought to the potential and consequences of strategic information warfare. As a result, they have suggested it be classified as a weapon of mass destruction, and have asked for the creation of "international legal regimes to prohibit the development, production, or use of particularly dangerous forms of information weapons".⁵⁵ This could mean that they might respond with their own weapons of mass destruction in the event that information warfare weapons attack them.

Information warfare may well prove to be one of the most critical emerging threats for a variety of reasons. First, it shifts the advantage from the defense to the offense. A country that feels that a conflict is inevitable will likely attempt a first strike using information warfare. Secondly, one of the major issues involved with information warfare is that it is virtually untraceable. How does a nation strike back with any degree of certainty if they do not know who attacked them? A third significant problem will be the shift in the balance of power in the international system. Information warfare requires virtually no capital to conduct and will soon be in the grasp of many countries. Furthermore, while countries such

⁵⁵ Campbell, Matthew (1998) "Logic Bomb' Arms Race Panics Russia," on InfoWar an online journal on IW. http://www.infowar.com/wmd/wmd_120898a_j.shtml.

as the United States currently enjoy the greatest advantage they also possess the greatest vulnerability. Finally, there is a question of responsibility. Does information warfare fall under the rubric of "management of violence"? Or, should it be the responsibility of another existing agency such as the NSA or the CIA? Or should there ultimately be a new organization created to deal with this challenge?

As one author notes, "(An) information war has no front line...Potential battlefields are anywhere."⁵⁶ Clearly, the United States will have to adjust their thinking once again when it comes to national security. Instead of living in a virtual fortress, American citizens will have to accept the fact that the potential exists for attack right in their own home. In recent years, Americans have come to believe that they are an unchallengable superpower. The reality of Strategic Information Warfare is that even the smallest of countries may achieve the ability to inflict serious damage on the United States. Will there be an impact on civil-military relationships when society wakes up one morning and finds Kansas City under information warfare siege?

One of the major challenges when discussing strategic information warfare is that it is more difficult to assign blame for an attack. Not only could it prove impossible to determine which government attacked you, but also it may in fact have not been a government at all. The reality of strategic information warfare is that it can be launched from computers located anywhere and not under the control of any national government. Additionally, if strategic information warfare proves to be viable, and if, as the Russians believe, it is a weapon of mass destruction, then the balance of power among nations will change dramatically. Most countries will then enjoy the benefits of owning a weapon of mass destruction for very little

⁵⁶ Ibid.

cost. This weapon will be very accessible to all, because it is not dependent on natural resources or a large industrial base to produce.

Transition States

In this new postwar environment the United States find ourselves as the lone superpower. We are now confronted with three large potential rivals emerging from the nation continent. How the United States chooses to deal with Russia, India and China may well have a profound impact on our future security. Each of these countries is in the nuclear club, and yet at the same time is somewhat starved for resources such as energy and capital. Society will be torn by two impulses, one, to invest in potential and make money, and secondly, to maneuver in such a way so as to maintain dominance over these potential rivals.

Another current challenge that the world faces is that of transition states. Currently, three nuclear powers -- Russia, China and India-- are attempting to undergo political and economic transition in order to be competitive in a globalized world. James Rosenau argues in *Turbulent Change* that there are three parameters in world politics, *orientation* (orientations of individuals), *structural* (global power distribution), and *relational* (the relationship between structure and the individual). Of these three parameters he says:

All three of these parameters are judged to be undergoing such a thoroughgoing transformation today as to bring about the first turbulence in world politics since comparable shifts culminated in the treaty of Westphalia in 1648.⁵⁷

He points out that the empowerment of the individual is most significant and says that while states and governments have weakened, the empowered individual is "requisite to the

⁵⁷ Rosenau, *Turbulent Change*, page 461.

expansivity and intensity of changes.”⁵⁸ This fundamental change introduces a significant challenge for transition states who instinctively fallback on an authoritarian model in times of crisis. As states resort to the old way to resolve issues, empowered individual's respondent with “. . . Instant demands, temporary coalitions, and policy reversals... all which propel events along the fall line of conflict in cooperation.”⁵⁹ For transition states the implication is clear: a state directed change in fundamental policy is likely to meet new and previously unencountered challenges from empowered individuals.

This leads us to one conclusion: the best way for transition states to accomplish significant change is to abandon top-down authoritative models of execution and use a flatter structure, were they acknowledge the new power of individuals and subgroups. Ultimately, even this course of action is has risk, but the alternatives are even more dangerous. When you couple this new environment with transition states that own nuclear weapons, significant challenges to international stability are clear.

Russia, China and India comprise 2.5 billion people and makeup a large percentage of the Asian land mass. Each of these countries will be in competition for scarce regional energy resources. Russia would like to believe that they have the upper hand in this competition. Their former Soviet republics possess much of the energy resources and are right on the border. However, the former republics are wary of Russian hegemony and see moves made by Russia as being done with only Russian interests in mind. While Russia and China already have a long border in common, Russia will resist any moves by China to expand its influence in that region.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 465.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 460.

China has over 1.2 billion inhabitants. It has slowly been making progress toward a modernized economy. Their major challenge will be to modernize their economy and provide their people with the information necessary to compete in the globalized world while at the same time preventing their people from attempting to overthrow the Communist government. There's a certain tension evident between the need for information to compete economically and the need to restrict information so that the government can survive. It is most likely that the Chinese government will not be able to prevent the spread of information amongst its people. This does not necessitate a new form of the Chinese government, but rather suggests that they will have to develop a new strategy in order to maintain power.

India, with one billion people, is yet another transition state. They have had conflicts with China and Pakistan, and currently there's a certain amount of tension between India and these two countries. Additionally, of the three transition states, they have the highest percentage of population density and are most likely to run into challenges in feeding their people and avoiding epidemics, and obtaining sufficient natural resources.

Of these three transition countries, probably the most dangerous is Russia. Russia was once a superpower, but that status is gone. Russia now faces double-digit inflation and unemployment, as well as a declining life expectancy. There are factories still open in Russia that actually take value away from the raw materials that they use. Much of the population has been raised to expect that the state will care for them. This is no longer the case, and could result in social unrest as they will have to figure out how to survive in a capitalist society.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Winston Wiley, Associate Deputy Director for the Central Intelligence Agency, in "Transnational Threats to NATO in 2010" presented to the 1998 European Symposium, National Defense University, Washington DC, February 10, 1998 suggested "that a Russia that broke with its current path of reform would overshadow all other transnational threats."

One of the critical aspects that is sometimes overlooked is how transitions are made in the era of globalization. Immediately upon a change of the Russian economy from communism to democracy, organized crime began to adapt. They took advantage of the benefits of the modern technology and became very efficient from almost the very beginning. If you contrast this with the bureaucratic government organizations that were still operating in the old way, it is clear that it was not a very equal match. Organized crime was able to immediately capitalize on its strengths before the government could get a solid foothold. Billions of dollars meant to shore up the waning economy were instead funneled to organized crime. The bureaucratic Russian government never had a chance to stem the growth of organized crime.

Russia is a former superpower with a flagging military. They no longer have the same respect on the world stage. Their submarines are sinking in the ocean and their soldiers are forced to grow their own potatoes in order to have food for the winter. One of the few sources of hard cash comes from the sale of oil. However, because of the challenges that Russia now faces, their oil production is down 50 percent in the last ten years.⁶¹ Another source of monetary support for their military is the sale of weapons abroad. Because the Russian military is so desperate for cash they will sell advanced weaponry to almost anyone. Additionally, their forces are in such disarray that accountability for all nuclear weapons is still questionable. Clearly, Russia is a state struggling to hold itself together. This poses several threats to the current global security environment. American security policy must necessarily change in order to meet possible new threats from transition states, while at the same time seeking to avoid alienating them. Up to now, the solution has been foreign aid.

⁶¹ John McCarthy, "The Geo-politics of Caspian Oil," *Jane's Intelligence review*, July 2000, Page 22.

The U.S. government has poured billions of dollars into the country, in the hopes of promoting democracy. This aid does not come without a cost. Other portions of the budget, including the Department of Defense, have consequently received less money.

What will be the impact of this on America's civil-military relations? What will society think as money is given to Russia instead of being spent on our own military? How will our military respond to the notion that we are giving money to a country that we are training to defend ourselves against?

The Accelerated Rate of Change

The challenge with all these problems that we have addressed is that the response is not progressing at the same rate as they are spreading. Weapons systems development takes place through a torturous bureaucratic process that can take between 10 and 15 years. This kind of response time is inadequate in a world where computer chip speeds double every 18 months.

Many of these issues will necessitate the finding of a new equilibrium both in the international security environment and between each society and their military. In the international arena, each new threat will go through a process of establishing norms and practices in conjunction with the challenges that are presented, in much the same way that thoughts about nuclear weapons evolved. While these issues are being sorted out, less stability is to be expected.

It is clear that these new issues make the world's security environment more dangerous. With some issues, such as scarce resources, new realities will have to be faced. The world cannot go on as if it had unlimited resources. With other issues, such as increased lethality of

weapons, new conventions and understandings will need to be arrived at. Regardless, it is clear that an increased rate of change has also increased the instability in the world and decreased the clarity of understandings that exist. This is a formula that indeed makes the world's security environment more dangerous. If the world could slowly ease into some of these new paradigms, it would likely be less volatile than having them thrust upon the earth's inhabitants. This is not the case. Instead, America's military will have to do their best in a situation where maintaining status quo is the best that they can hope for.

An analysis of this spectrum of emerging threats clearly demonstrates that both the American society and the American military need to start thinking about national security in a very different way. It is no longer reasonable to believe that if a country can merely defend its physical borders it will have achieved national security. Instead, the notion of security has moved from physical defense to a much larger variety of issues. One of the most noteworthy points to be gleaned from this new list of emerging security threats is how very different they are from the common notion of national security. Typically, many of these threats have a much larger technological component. A growing trend in these new threats is how little they have in common with the management of violence. The "careful study" by military professionals that Huntington advocates will not necessarily prepare an officer to comprehend and deal with some of these new threats. Additionally, many of these threats will have a very significant impact on the society that the military is sworn to protect. These threats serve to make borders more porous, and place virtually everyone in the society at a far greater risk than they previously faced. Essentially, these threats produce a democratization of violence. While the state may be the only legitimate controller of violence, technology makes it much more accessible to non-state actors.

This change in society's risk is something that will necessitate a new understanding in civil-military relations within the United States. These new threats will require a re-examination of society's infatuation with civil liberties and force them to make some difficult choices between civil liberties and security. They will change some of the basic assumptions that society makes about security, and demand that society face the need for a trade off between these two conflicting notions.

An equally drastic change will have to take place within the military. The sequestered professional who studies his craft must become a thing of the past. The military will have to vastly change the nature of the things that they study. They will have to focus more on political implications of their actions, and on strategic implications of new technology. In order to do this, they may have to pursue a military more widely steeped in intellectual capital. To accomplish this, it is likely that they will have to depart even further from Huntington's notion of the traditional military officer. The challenge for the modern military will be to recruit those individuals from society who, even though they would not typically be considered to be traditional military material, possess the vital knowledge which the military needs in order to conduct a viable defense. This necessitates, as Janowitz predicted, a departure from the structured and orderly to search for the creative and unconventional.

When one looks at the progression of the civil-military relationship, the cause and effect chain is fairly obvious. The information age has brought about a variety of new threats, some of which are as a direct result of the information age and others of which merely happened to be occurring at this time. Regardless of the factor that caused these new emerging threats, it is clear that the civil-military relationship has only one course of action

in order to pursue a viable defense. The military must embrace Janowitz's five hypotheses and vigorously pursue them if they are to meet the challenges of the coming century.

Society, for their part, must seek to integrate the military as much as possible. The distance between the two must be closed, and transition between the two must be easier in both directions. The only solution for the military to meet these new technological threats is to more closely resemble a culture that works well with technology. The obvious choice for a template is the very society that they protect.

CHAPTER 4

EXPECTATIONS IN A CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

One of the major issues that must be examined when talking about civil-military relations is the level of interaction and discourse. Traditionally, the writers concerned with civil-military relations are talking about the very highest political level.⁶² They focus on the level of involvement of the military in the formulation of security policy, almost to the exclusion of examining the grass-roots relationship between the average civilian and the average military service member. As further examination in this paper will demonstrate, this relationship will prove to be critical in a future security environment.

Because America's security policy is one strongly motivated by public opinion, it is vital to have an informed public developing these opinions. The new security environment that the world faces is one in which a variety of issues and dilemmas are thrust upon the public by the media. Often times, the nature of the presentation leads the public to demand action. If the public does not have an accurate understanding as to the capabilities of the military they can often ask the military to perform duties that are outside their realm of expertise. Additionally, some of the new security threats significantly blur the distinction between concepts such as foreign and domestic. Terrorism, information warfare, and homeland defense are all concepts that have both foreign and domestic implications. Traditionally, the military is thought of as an organization that takes action outside of the

⁶² See for example, Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* and Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*.

United States and only under the most limited circumstances, domestically.⁶³ In the future, several major issues will test the relationship between the American public and their military forces.

Protection of the Homeland

One of the first understandings that society and their military will have to arrive at is the exact nature of the new modern security environment. As I argued earlier, the exact nature of the threat to society and the exact mission of the military are something that changes as the security environment changes. Globalization and the information age have introduced a vast new spectrum of threats, and now highlight the possibility that the military will need to perform tasks that are not traditionally thought of as being within their realm of capabilities. More importantly, society will need to have a better understanding of what these new threats mean to national security and what the military can do about them. Some of these new threats, especially those that concern homeland defense, can fundamentally impact the very nature of the traditional American civil-military relationship. Society, like civilian policy makers, over estimates the military's capabilities. They lack a realistic understanding of what the military can accomplish in terms of security. It is doubtful that they have considered any tradeoffs between their domestic security and their civil liberties.

It is very likely that America's military will not be able to defend America's heartland, or provide the same degree of security to America's citizens that they have in the past. Up to this point, American citizens have been virtually immune to foreign attack while on domestic

⁶³ Domestic military action has been limited to natural disasters such as hurricanes, forest fires, and floods and also to certain border defense issues such as stemming the flow of illegal immigrants across the United States border with Mexico.

soil, with the exception of a few terrorist attacks carried out on high visibility targets. The only major danger that threatened American citizens has been scattered terrorist bombings of international airliners and buildings on foreign soil. Much of this will change as new technology makes the terrorist more sophisticated and provides him with other avenues of attack such as information warfare. While it is not inevitable, it is possible that America could find itself under siege, with a security environment much like Israel now possesses. A situation such as this is very different from America's traditional view of the level of security they enjoy, and the role and prominence of the military in providing it.

America's Ability to Retaliate

Another strain on America's civil-military relationship will be that of the military's inability to provide retaliation for such attacks. In cases such as information warfare and some terrorist attacks, unless an individual or group steps forward to claim responsibility, it is likely that the military and other American intelligence organizations will have a difficult time in confidently assigning responsibility for the action. Information warfare, as it is now envisioned, can be routed through a variety of countries in order to mask responsibility. Just because an attack originates in a country it does not necessarily mean that the country is responsible. Information warfare can be considered to be a weapon of mass destruction capable of being used by individuals or small groups. It is not necessarily a weapon accessible only to the state. There is bound to be disappointment on the part of society as they come to the realization that their defenders can't even identify the attacker.

Preserve the Force

A major issue that will have to be dealt with is the new reality of casualty taking. Recently, in contrast to the Vietnam era, Americans have gained the idea that wars and other

military actions can be fought with virtually no casualties. The Gulf War cemented this precedent. General Record makes a sobering prediction in the aftermath of Desert Storm, saying:

... Desert Storm's spectacular brevity and cleanliness. . . Will inescapably provide the benchmark. . . It is a benchmark probably impossible to replicate ever again. If the Desert Storm U.S. military force planning was haunted by the disastrous legacy of Vietnam, post Desert Storm planning will be plagued by the specter of falling short of the splendid and relatively painless performance of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf in 1991.⁶⁴

The reality of future military concepts is much different from this perception. It is very likely that the United States will become much more vulnerable in the future, both in terms of force-on-force engagements and in terms of retaliatory strikes against America's heartland. The reality is that American military forces will no longer enjoy the superiority that they have had in the past. Because of the change in the balance between military security and economic security, it is possible that future enemies may enjoy asymmetric advantages. As this is a drastic change from society's current perception, I will devote a chapter to examining exactly how America has arrived at such a sobering dilemma.

Each of these three issues will require a new construct of American civil-military relations that is much different from what we currently have. The major issue is not so much the degree to which American military officers are involved with the American political system, but rather a monumental change in how American society and their military understand the implied contract of security that each believes they have with the other. For society, this means the need to accept new risks in terms of national security. For the

military, this implies the need to increase its level of communication with the civilian sector and also to be prepared to do new missions. These new missions will require a vastly different approach and mindset than what currently dominates military thinking. The approach and mindset that the military needs to adopt is one very much like that of society. This means that the military needs to move deliberately in the direction of society, if they wish to be prepared for their new missions.

Ultimately, both the military and society must realize that civil-military relations depend on the security environment. If they want to maintain a viable relationship, they will have to be cognizant of changes that occur in the environment. For society, this entails a realization that future security will not be as assured as it was in the past. It also means gaining a new and more realistic understanding of the military's capabilities and vulnerabilities. The days when conflicts could be fought with almost zero friendly casualties never existed; Desert Storm was an aberration.⁶⁵ For the Military, this means recognizing the new characteristics that they will have to acquire in order to respond to future security threats. More importantly, it means abandoning traditional isolationist principles in favor of a military more in line with popular societal culture. The new characteristics that the military needs to adopt are those that society possesses. For both, it means pursuing enhanced communications so that there are no surprises in the future.

⁶⁴ Record, "Force Projection/Crisis Response," :158. Quoted in Dauber, Cori "The Role of Visual Imagery in Casualty Shyness and Casualty Aversion". Chapter in an unpublished book by Peter Feaver. See also <http://www.unc.edu/depts/tiss/CIVMIL.htm>.

⁶⁵ See general Shinseki's comments on Frontline "The Future of War: U.S. Army" aired Oct 24, 2000.

CHAPTER 5

RMA AND THE ARMS TRADE

In addition to the emerging threats, the U.S. is confronted with an additional problem, the Revolution in Military Affairs(RMA). The American Army has undergone an RMA, and currently enjoys a substantial advantage over other militaries in the world. This lead, while it is large is not sustainable. The whole idea of a Revolution in Military Affairs is also suggesting that new problems will emerge even for the United States. Because the American military gets many of their weapons systems from commercial vendors, there is the tendency to want to limit the weapons export. Because commercial vendors are driven by profits, they have a need to export as much technology as quickly as possible. This introduces a tension between economic security and military security, two components of comprehensive national security. If the economic security is allowed to take precedence, it is likely that the military will face a more prepared foe than they had in the past. If, on the other hand, military security wins out, it is likely that much of our source of superiority (the high-tech economy) will wither and die because it is unable to compete in the international marketplace. An additional problem that is introduced with increased exports is that of a new parity of military forces. If nations feel the probability of victory in a conflict has increased, they might be more likely to resort to violence to solve problems. The solution to this has not yet been resolved, but this issue may well make the world a more dangerous place.

Misconception That Bloodless Wars are Possible

The combination of the RMA that the American military has undergone and the increase in media coverage of the Gulf War has created a dangerous situation. The civilian sector has arrived at the conclusion that the military can conduct virtually bloodless operations. This conclusion is wrong, and dangerous for a variety of reasons. First, it provides an impetus for the government to use the military in a variety of unconventional situations for which they are essentially unprepared. Secondly, it creates an unobtainable standard for the military to meet in future operations.⁶⁶ Third, it reinforces notions of casualty aversion that may in fact weaken American foreign policy when reality does not meet expectations. These problems ultimately introduce the potential for a future rift in civil-military relations by a civilian sector that feels let down and a military that feels it has been saddled with unrealistic expectations. The reality of the current arms trade is much different than the current perception, and will likely undermine America's perception that wars can be fought in a less violent way.

The Rules for Security have Changed

There is a new notion of achieving security that uses much the same logic of security as MAD. Globalization and the information age have brought about changes in the military industrial complex of every nation. These changes have led the leading thinkers of security studies to an inescapable conclusion: in order for a nation to survive economically in the information age, it must promote worldwide proliferation of information technology. It is no

⁶⁶ The Gulf War was unique for two reasons; first, Iraq passed up a golden opportunity to destroy the 82nd Airborne Division when they first deployed. Second, the desert was uniquely suited to enhance the abilities of America's high tech weapons against the low tech Armor of the Iraqis.

longer enough to design weapons and safeguard them. A nation must now pursue the distribution of them in the name of profit, so that it can design better and more lethal weapons. The idea of selling military technology to a nation's adversaries in order to strengthen national economic security does not seem like a viable solution to a security dilemma. How was this conclusion arrived at?

The information age has, in fact, changed all of the rules. Whether or not you celebrate the notion of better, faster, cheaper, deeper, it is a reality that we must deal with.⁶⁷ What this has brought us to is the redefining of ideas, identities, and ideologies. The notion of security is no longer measured merely by feet of concrete and barbed wire on a Maginot Line, or by the height and thickness of a wall. Security is now carrying the additional concepts like information warfare and cyber-attacks. The realization of Moore's Law⁶⁸ has brought about a new way of thinking. In the past, security can be thought of as a line on a graph, trending slowly upward. From time to time, a new technology is introduced, and its impact changes all of the rules of warfare that were previously embraced. The machine gun is one of these inventions, negating the advantage of the mass offensive and making the battle field a much more lethal place. Unfortunately, it took the strategists years to realize this and to think clearly about new notions of warfare.

The world finds itself in a similar situation today. This change is not about introducing a new weapon, like the machine gun, or a new platform, like the submarine or airplane. It is

⁶⁷ The Lexis and the Olive Tree, Thomas L. Friedman, 1999.

⁶⁸ Geoffrey Moore was president of Intel, and observed that the speeds achievable with the integrated circuit doubled every 18 months.

about a quantum shift in their lethality. The application of better, faster, cheaper, deeper to the military industrial complex threatens to unleash the four horsemen on a global scale.

Information technologies change all of the rules of warfare, and produce an effect so radical that it may well be missed unless we focus our imagination and creativity on the problem. Notions such as the inherent linearity of warfare can be done away with using a modicum of imagination. In fact, the Army After Next (AAN) study says:

AAN research and ForceXXI experimentation indicate that the twentieth century combat paradigm of fixed lines with tied-in flanks, largely secure rear areas, echeloned formations, deliberately phased operations, and direct-fire engagements executed by large maneuvering formations is subject to radical change. The future battlespace will have few or no sanctuaries; forces deployed to any region in the theater will be vulnerable to a blend of conventional and unconventional attack.⁶⁹

These are the realities of applying information technologies to weapons. The application of information technology makes every platform and weapon more lethal, and demands that nations rethink every notion about strategy and warfighting, or risk losing the next confrontation to someone who can see the new paradigm more clearly. While there is a strong desire to make small incremental changes in the name of "safety", the reality is that failing to embrace revolutionary change may well prove fatal.

Military-Industrial Relationships

Information technology cannot be ignored. When it is examined, we see that it arises from a different source than previous sources of technology. The term "spin off" technology came into vogue when the analysts examined the military- industrial complex and realized that many of the greatest military innovations had commercial applications. This realization

⁶⁹ Army After Next Project, 1998 Annual Report Page. 9.

brought about the popular concept that military spending was good because it allowed scientists to explore and create even though a commercial application was not readily apparent. Whether or not this is true is debatable and moot.

The information age has brought about a new reality, that of "spin-on". This simply means that the commercial sector is now designing commercial products that have military applications. The use of spin-on technologies by the military has been growing at a rapid rate over the years, because virtually all of the information technology is developed within the commercial sector, and this technology is vital to our security. The change from spin-off to spin-on happened in a variety of sectors, but especially in the area of software. Software is the commercial sector upon which DoD is currently most dependent. The Defense Science Board of the United States recently published a report, in which they argue that the impact of the information age is that:

The commercialization of defense technology is in part due to a shift in procurement emphasis away from weapons and platforms to the sophisticated information technologies that are so amplifying their capabilities.⁷⁰

This is the issue that points to the problem. Because militaries are now getting many of their most lethal weapons from the commercial sector, they must heed the market forces that are in play.

The Defense Science Board says that the decision to depend more heavily on commercial support came about when the DoD realized that the centerpiece of their future

⁷⁰ Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Globalization and Security, Page. 7-8.

warfighting strategy was based on information technologies. The Army After Next study says:

Knowledge encompasses battlespace information and situational awareness, i.e., that knowledge about one's own forces, other friendly forces, and the enemy's forces essential to battle effectiveness. As the primary and universal enabler for virtually all battlespace functions during all phases of conflict, knowledge is paramount; it affects everything.⁷¹

This conclusion left them with the choice of developing their own software or buying Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) software. They went with the COTS for the following three reasons:

- Affordability brought on by economies of scale. Since this software has a commercial application, the commercial purchasers shoulder the cost of most of the R&D. The Military is no longer the largest client of many of these software programs.
- Ride the wave of product improvement. The software is not frozen in the same way that exclusive military products are. Since this software was designed for commercial purposes, the companies are continuously improving it. This is in sharp contrast to the one time delivery that military contracts typically entail.
- Extensive documentation for training and troubleshooting. Since this software has a vast user base, a firm with commercial intentions puts out a robust training and troubleshooting package. This same package is available to the military for a very small cost.⁷²

⁷¹ Army After Next Project, 1998 Annual Report Page. 9.

⁷² Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Globalization and Security, Page. 8-9.

The Dilemma of Commercial Sector Reliance

Herein lies the problem. The source of our new security is also the source of our insecurity. The commercial sector designs products with only one focus, profit. When the military-industrial complex determines that it needs this technology for national defense, there is an intuitive parallel idea that they should stop the spread of this technology to other countries as much as possible, or at least limit the spread to their allies. This idea is at odds with the wishes of the commercial creators, who wish to maximize profits. The stifling of potential profits weakens the commercial company, and hinders the development of the next round of innovations that can be spun on to national defense. As the commercial sector is threatened in this way, the companies either physically migrate to a country with a better business climate, or they are weakened. In either case, this cripples the ability of the nation to achieve its security, as other countries are getting the new technology that they once coveted.⁷³

The Defense Science Board has looked at this issue, and determined that the only way for the US to maintain its military security through economic stability is to allow the spread of almost all technology that has dual use applications.⁷⁴ They recommend that unless the nation is the sole source of the innovation, that is to say we have a monopoly on the innovation, we should allow the sale throughout the world. They further say that technology must be critical to the national defense for it to warrant being kept a secret. Even if the only other possessor of the technology is an ally, the DSB seems to think that it is inevitable that it will spread, and if the nation doesn't allow it's sale, we are weakening our own economy,

⁷³ Ibid., 10 .

⁷⁴ Ibid., 15-17.

and hence our military. Failure to give enough attention to either of these facets is something that could prove fatal in the long run. They conclude:

“Over time, all states-not just the United States and its allies- will share access to much of the technology underpinning the modern military.”⁷⁵

This introduces an obvious tension, where the solution to a nation's economic security is to give away portions of its military security. These two facets each have excellent arguments for their point of view. They each play a role in a nation's comprehensive security, however, in the new security environment they are opposed. In the old way of thinking about security, preventing the enemy from gaining access to your military industrial base was paramount. In this new paradigm, unless you can insure sole use and perfect safeguarding of technology, it will be sold to everyone else, and any nation that chooses not to participate in the new system will degrade their nations economic security. Patents are useless to this idea of safeguarding. If something impacts a nation's security, any means necessary will be used to incorporate it into the security structure.

The Army After Next Project recognizes this challenge, stating:

Instead, by closely monitoring U.S. military developments, major competitors will probably develop creative asymmetric strategies and employ niche capabilities aimed at avoiding U.S. strengths and capitalizing on U.S. vulnerabilities.⁷⁶

Among those challenges most threatening are:

- Capability for precision fires with increased lethality at extended ranges.
- Weapons and technologies (delivered by a variety of means) capable of mass effects.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 3.

⁷⁶ Army After Next Project, 1998 Annual Report Page. 2.

- Highly accurate medium- and long-range cruise and ballistic missiles.
- Capabilities to enhance C4 ISR through the exploitation of space platforms and the global information infrastructure.⁷⁷

Information technology also introduces other problems. Because most of it is focused on software, it is almost impossible to safeguard. In previous national security constructs, it was difficult to move information, something physical had to be carried through security checkpoints, and physical access was necessary to steal something. In the information age, knowledge and information can be moved easily, and access to that knowledge no longer requires physical access, only a computer terminal situated anywhere in the world. The Defense Science Board notes: "Much of the technology that the U.S. is most anticipating leveraging to maintain military superiority is that which DoD is *least* capable of denying its potential competitors."⁷⁸

Another dilemma of this new security paradigm is that the software being bought by the military is so complex, the DSB believes that it is impossible to be sure that there isn't a "bug" or a "backdoor" imbedded somewhere in the code. The logical extension of this fear is for a programmer to secretly put a backdoor in his programs, and sell the knowledge of this back door to the highest bidder, quite possibly a rival government or a cyber-terrorist.⁷⁹

These two issues help to highlight the crux of the dilemma: in the pursuit of security, the nation has achieved greater insecurity, and the world is developing into a place fraught

⁷⁷ Ibid.

^{78,79} Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Globalization and Security, Page. 22.

with new problems and realities. This is not to say that the nation had a choice.

Globalization is the proverbial genie, which now that it has been let out of the bottle, must be accepted and dealt with. The world cannot impose its own set of rules on globalization.

Paradigm shifts do not respond to wishes, they are simply what they are.

The other alternative to limiting the proliferation of dual use software, which has been determined to be unfeasible, is to limit the spread of the platforms and weapons systems that they can be applied to. This is the basic thrust of all arms control efforts up to this time, and thus far has made little progress. The greatest challenge to this approach is that brought about by the information age. The knowledge and ability to build conventional weapons is becoming progressively easier to acquire and use. Even if the weapons systems produced are not state of the art, there is a certain point where quantity becomes quality. The other issue with these low-tech conventional weapons is the proliferation of the software that can change these low-tech platforms into competitive purveyors of lethality.

Response to the Dilemma

Since we find ourselves at this point, the question is how to deal with it. The nation has concluded that its only choice is to make the world a potentially more dangerous place by distributing the knowledge of lethality across the board. This was merely the best option from a list of unattractive choices. To do anything else would put the nation's economic security at risk. What then can be done in the face of this new reality? Present analysis predicts that the US will continue to be powerful, but that the potential exists for smaller

⁷⁹ Ibid., 18.

nations to focus on one aspect of their national security and to gain an asymmetric advantage worldwide. The Army After Next report concludes:

Our growing reliance on commerce as a major source of new technologies and services will not be lost on potential adversaries. Proliferation in the open market will test the Army's ability to maintain a technological edge. State and nonstate entities may challenge us by fielding capabilities that are asymmetric counters to our own, many derived directly from the marketplace.⁸⁰

This advantage may capitalize on something that is already a relative weakness of the US, and be formidable enough to win a limited confrontation.

An example of this notion of asymmetric threat is the ability to deny access to ones shores. Currently, the US is the only country with the ability to project power anywhere in the world. A breakthrough in defenses in this area could give a much weaker country the ability to deny littoral and air access. Without the ability to project power, the US's ability to conduct warfare would be greatly hampered, and would give a much smaller government the real expectation that it could achieve a victory, or at least avoid a loss; which in some cases is sufficient to achieve one's goals.

In realizing that the nation is faced with these new truths, it must build a new way of achieving our national security. Under the old defense contracting system, a procurement cycle was 18 years long. This meant that from inception to completion, the project took 18 years.⁸¹ This kind of a time line is simply unacceptable under the new rules of the information age. In that 18 year time period, computer chip speeds have doubled 10 times, making the weapons system obsolete before it can be fielded, and perhaps redefining the logic of the system at the same time.

⁸⁰ Army After Next Project, 1998 Annual Report, Special Report on Technology Annex A, Page. A-1.

⁸¹ Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Globalization and Security, Page. 14.

There is a saying that you should leave good enough alone. This is the trap that must be avoided. The nation must resist doing things a certain way simply because that is the way that it has done them in the past, and the Defense Department needs to free systems and platforms from their historical constructs. They must strive to think outside of the box, and be willing to accept that reality is changing at the speed of Moore's Law. This means that the nation needs to think about national security in terms of ships without sailors, planes without pilots, and tanks without tankers.

How then, will the U.S. maintain its dominance on a playing field that globalization has leveled? This is the question that many are asking, but there seems to be no consensus. The simple answer that the AAN board has arrived at is that "comparative advantage comes from the skill and application of the user, not the technology itself."⁸²

Or as the Defense Science Board puts it:

...when the whole world has the same military-technological cookbook, the United States will need to rely on its unique strengths as a "chef", that is, as the world's most innovative integrator of military useful-thought not always U.S. developed-technology.⁸³

Ultimately, what this means to the military is that in the future they will not likely enjoy such a qualitative mismatch when involved in a conflict. The next war may very possibly result in a significant amount of casualties being taken by American forces. Equally relevant to America's civil-military relationship is that these casualties will be unanticipated by American society. The obvious conclusion that society may draw is that the military has failed to prepare themselves for the conflict, and squandered what appeared to be an

⁸² Appendix 3, FY98 Army After Next Special Operations Franchise Report Page. B-16.

insurmountable lead that they enjoyed at the time of the Gulf War. This is not the case.

Instead, the new global environment will lead to a leveling of the playing field, where many countries will enjoy parity, at least with regard to certain portions of their national defense.

Additionally, this trend will promote a democratization of violence and empowerment of the individual. More countries and individuals will have access to greater lethality. Some of this newfound lethality will be difficult to defend against, even within the United States. Society needs to be aware of this fact in order to maintain a realistic outlook on the military's capabilities in the risks of foreign policy.

⁸³ Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Globalization and Security, Page. 29.

CHAPTER 6

THE PRESENT CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

The first issue that needs to be examined is where exactly civil-military relationships stand at this time. Probably one of the best assessments can be found in the study produced by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies. The purpose of the study was: “. . . to determine whether there is a gap between civilian society and the military, and if so whether differing values, opinions, perspectives, and experience, harm military effectiveness and civil-military cooperation.”⁸⁴

As the study notes, there has always been a certain degree of tension between civil society and the military. Large standing militaries were thought to be a threat to the rest of society and thus Americans have always sought to minimize the size and strength of their military by relying as much as possible on citizen soldiers.⁸⁵ The current post Cold War military is the first significant departure from this policy.

This project sought to address three questions:

- Do post-Cold War military values, attitudes, opinions, and perspectives diverge from those in civilian society, and if so, how?
- Is this divergence, if it exists, growing and if so, why?

⁸⁴ Digest of Findings and Studies, Cantigny Version, TISS Project on the Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society. Page 3.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 2.

- How do any gaps affect policy in the area of grand strategy, operations, and structure? How does or might in the future, a gap affect civil-military relationships?

Peter Feaver's conclusion was that: "Concerns about a growing gap between the military and civilian worlds are justified but should not be exaggerated. Our research identified numerous schisms and trends that have undermined civil-military cooperation and, in certain circumstances could degrade military effectiveness, but these problems cannot be called a crisis."⁸⁶

The study does identify several trends that are relevant to the challenge of developing a proactive civil-military policy. A basic understanding of these trends is necessary to serve as a point of departure for the debate.

One of the first and most remarkable changes that set apart military officers from their civilian counterparts is their distinctive conservative quality. Whereas in the past military officers were traditionally nonpartisan, this is no longer the case. Republican military officers now outnumber Democrats by a ratio of 8 to 1.⁸⁷ At the same time, their civilian counterparts are evenly split. This is an interesting and significant metamorphosis because it has taken place in only the last 25 years. But this is only half the story. Feaver notes that the gap appears to be widest in issues involving ideology and values, and much less so in the area of specific policy.⁸⁸ It may well be argued that this gap has occurred because of a shift of values on the part of society; while at the same time, the military ideology has changed

⁸⁶ Ibid., 2.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

much more slowly. This ideological split between civil society and the military also explains why military officers are pessimistic about the moral health of civilian society.⁸⁹

When talking about the civilian leadership that oversees the military, it is noteworthy that two-thirds of the military officers believe the political leadership is either somewhat or very ignorant with regards to military affairs.⁹⁰ This is significant evidence that the military perceives a gap between the military and civil society. This should not be surprising, as the military continues to embrace Huntington's notion of civil military relations. If you accept Huntington's argument that a lifetime of study is required to be a military professional, then it only makes sense that all others who have not studied at this level are "ignorant".

Feaver has also identified the traditional gaps in thinking surrounding gays serving openly in the military and women serving in combat.⁹¹ He notes that the military feels it has taken necessary steps to address sexual harassment. Civilian elites believe that the military has not done enough. Feaver suggests that because the military believes in the necessity for a traditional warrior (and male) culture that these issues will continue to be a major source of disagreement.⁹²

Another trend that has disturbing implications is the decline in military experience of civilian leadership. Feaver notes that there is a correlation between the use of force and the amount of military experience that the civilian leadership has. He writes: "At least since 1816... The more veterans in the national political elite, the less likely the US is to initiate

⁸⁸ Ibid., 3.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 4.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

the use of force in the international arena.”⁹³ This is surprising, because one would not anticipate veterans to be the” doves” in a debate about foreign policy.

As fewer Americans perform military service, we can expect that there will continue to be a decline in the number of veterans in the national political elite. Unless steps are taken to somehow bridge the gap on this issue, Feaver suggests that as military experience declines the likelihood for the U.S. to engage in conflict will increase.⁹⁴ Rosenau’s notion of the empowered individual has implications in each of these issues. When considered against a backdrop of ever-increasing conservatism in the military, several things become clear. First, it might be suggested that the military’s abrupt shift to conservatism is, in part, a product of newfound independence on the part of empowered individuals. With less influence from the hierarchic organization, individuals are freer to formulate their own opinions. This rapid change by subgroup (military officers) is exactly as Rosenau predicted.

When combining Rosenau’s theory with Feaver’s findings, additional implications become evident. First, the same individual empowerment that has led to a conservative officer corps will make them less effective in accomplishing goals that are at odds with the wishes of society. Just as the officers have become more empowered, so to as every other individual in the organization. Authoritative leadership styles are no longer effective for controlling military operations. The result of a shift in the level of decision-making and the empowerment of the individual is that military operations are effectively screened by a larger number of decision-makers. Additionally, each decision-maker is able to collect his own information about a situation and question the decisions of others that do not seem correct.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

Other effects of individual empowerment can also be anticipated. It is likely that the military will become more reflective of society. The military will receive more liberal input from society as the military hierarchy continues to lose control over the message that its members are exposed to. We can also suppose that the military will have an increased impact in foreign policy issues. Cogent opinions can be broadcast across the world with the help of the electronic media; this gives the military a voice in society that they did not previously enjoy. E-mail can travel around the world instantaneously, and opinions can find their way to a national forum without the previous filters.⁹⁵

Taken as a whole, we can anticipate that many aspects of the military will change as individuals within the organization gain a new voice. This new voice may stem the effects of a dwindling military voice in Congress. Not only will the organization become less hierarchic in order to accomplish its missions, but the military will also probably have less control over its members. There is a good chance that this will help to make the military more reflective of the society which they defend.

Feaver's findings of the current state of the civil-military relationship tell us several important things about the issue. First, that there is a significant undercurrent of conservatism present in the military. Secondly, the military no longer feels that it is communicating well with their civilian leadership. Third, the military still embraces their traditional warrior culture, something that will have to change as they rise to meet the new threats or as they try

⁹⁵ A perfect example of this is the crash of a Blackhawk helicopter in Hawaii on the 13th of February, 2001. 8 soldiers died in the crash, and it received little attention from the media. The following weekend, race car driver Dale Earnhardt died in a crash; the event was covered extensively. Several days later (21 February), e-mail written by a soldier began to circulate, lamenting the fact that a millionaire received so much attention, and these 8 soldiers died in obscurity. Within two weeks (3 March), this position was expressed (almost verbatim), by Tom Joiner, host of a nationally syndicated radio talk show, as he broadcast live from Aspen (not exactly a conservative venue). The ability of an individual soldier to be heard in a national forum is striking, and this trend will undoubtedly continue.

to integrate these "warriors" into a corporate environment. Finally, the military has something to contribute to a national defense policy debate. Contrary to the customary "Hawk" label that they have, they are more likely to be an influence for peaceful solutions. If the military is going to continue to be capable of defending against new emerging threats, then each of these issues will have to be remedied in one fashion or another.

CHAPTER 7

CURRENT PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Previously, much of the discussion concerning civil-military relations has been centered on the very highest levels of national decision making in regards to security policy.

Although this is an important aspect of civil-military relations, it is not the only aspect that needs to be examined. An often-ignored issue involving civil-military relations is that of the grass-roots level. Namely, how the average American thinks about the military, what they think the role of the military is, and where exactly the civil-military balance stands at this point. The reality is that because of the new set of emerging security threats, it is likely that a significantly different relationship will have to be established between soldiers and civilians at the grass-roots level. Society and the military will have to become much more open and communicative, breaking from the trend which has been growing since the establishment of the All-Volunteer Force. A significant aspect of this is that the military has not shown any significant movement toward an increased dialogue with their civilian counterparts during the Cold War and post-Cold War era. Rather, for reasons that I will not explore in this paper, the military has historically maintained a somewhat isolationist structure.⁹⁶ This structure is one that may enhance security but does not contribute to civil-military relations at the grass-roots level. In fact, it has been characterized as “unhealthy” by retired military officers.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, Pages 211 – 221.

⁹⁷ Pat Towell is the military's warrior culture in America's best interest? C Q Weekly 2 Jan 1999.

The survey of emerging threats suggests that there will be a significant need for increased communications between society and military personnel if we are to avoid misunderstandings that could be potentially acerbic. The first question to address is why emerging threats necessitate a change in the equation. As previously discussed, these new threats significantly change how national security must be thought of and dealt with by both the military and society. The notion of Fortress America is a thing of the past. In the future it is quite likely that the first indication of an attack will be detected and/or felt in the United States, rather than on some remote battlefield. It is very possible that the attack will be as much of a surprise as Pearl Harbor was. New technologies and new threats have decreased the American military's ability to ensure that conflict is fought on someone else's territory.

A second aspect of these emerging threats is that they are not things that would typically be considered to be under the purview of the military. Rather, many of them are issues that have a decidedly non-military look to them. Computer hackers do not have the same martial quality as armored cavalry. If the issues are to be dealt with effectively, then it is imperative that an understanding of responsibility be reached between the military and the civilians for whom they produce national security. In its current configuration, the military is not set up to deal with many security issues as effectively as the nation would like.

Humanitarian intervention is just one example of this problem. While the military has done an excellent job when called upon to perform humanitarian intervention, it is clear that an organization set up, armed, and trained differently could do even better. This is clearly a case where "when all one owns is a hammer, everything looks like a nail." If we are to avoid even greater pitfalls in the future, then it is necessary that responsibilities be established and understood among all parties.

One of the major changes in this new environment will have to be a change to the military's fundamental propensity towards isolationism. If one looks at the military's current status, it almost seems as if many programs and policies have been set out specifically to foster isolation between the military and civilians. Military personnel can go for weeks and even months without ever leaving the confines of their base. They have housing on the base, recreational facilities on the base, stores to shop for food and clothing, schools for their children, and in some cases even colleges for them to focus on higher learning. Military commanders will be quick to point out that the setup is necessary for several reasons. First they will say that this is an issue of force protection. By having all of these amenities available on post it is easier to protect the force from any sort of terrorist attack.

This is curiously the same dilemma that is found in the upper level of civil-military relations. The argument that has been discussed is that the military presents their arguments based only on security concerns, independent of social and political issues. Here we have the same thing, with the military isolating itself, justifying its actions with arguments based on security. At the same time, they ignore the sociological implications of an isolated military. There is some merit to this argument, but the obvious question is why shouldn't all Americans enjoy better protection.

Secondly, commanders will point to the convenience of having all of these things near the soldiers and their families. Why, they will ask, should soldiers have to drive off post every time that they want to buy a newspaper or gallon of milk? Why should their children be forced to go to schools that do not understand the special needs of children who move every few years? Why should families be subjected to the whim of off post housing development when the military can provide them with safe and convenient housing much

nearer the workplace? All of this makes for a cogent argument, the military people who expend so much energy in protecting and defending the nation should not have to be subjected to additional inconveniences that are entirely avoidable.

Finally, military commanders will effectively argue that this boils down to money. The military, they will say, does not have the money to allow all of its members to move off post. Additionally, the military members do not have the money to buy all of their food and clothing on the local economy rather than on post. Local economies that surround the base would not be able to handle the influx of additional students to their schools or the higher demand on their infrastructure. This argument is valid. However, the critical assumption upon which the argument rests is that it is not possible for the military to somehow be compensated for these additional costs.

There are counterpoints to each of these arguments. But the pragmatist will first pose the challenge: why fix something if it isn't broken? The reality is that it is broken. Even though the military has put forth a variety of excellent arguments in support of policies that do in effect isolate the military from the civilian population, there is one vital argument that is missed. One of the effects of the downsizing of the military is a loss of contact between the grass-roots civilian population and military.⁹⁸ During the Cold War almost everyone had some relationship with the military. They had either served themselves, had a relative who served, or knew someone who had served. This is no longer the case. Instead, those who served in the military typically come from two major demographic groups, the rural South and the inner city. Immediately upon entering military service, and for the majority of the time they serve, soldiers are kept on military bases. Whether by design or coincidence, the

⁹⁸ Skelton urges Soldiers, civilians to reach out, develop understanding "Civil-Military Gap" could harm Leadership Role of the U.S., he warns St. Louis Post Dispatch 11 Nov, 1999.

interaction of soldiers with civilians is drastically curtailed. The result of this is a critical shortfall in civil-military relations today. Each of these groups is not aware of the feelings and beliefs of the other. Also, the military believes that civilians have very little knowledge of what the military does while fulfilling their mission. Even more disconcerting are the resulting conclusions that each draws about the other group with little or no contact. The implication of this, when combined with the new emerging security threats, is a grave misunderstanding between the two groups. In the future security environment, grassroots civilians will likely feel that the military has let them down, and not provided them with the security that they had expected. On the other hand, the military will feel that they are being unfairly asked to perform missions that they never said they could accomplish, and are being blamed for the less than optimal results. Additionally, these emerging threats can pose a new level of insecurity within the nation's heartland. An examination of this issue suggests a drastic change in the nation's long adhered-to principles.

One of the first steps that needs to be taken is to increase communications at the grass-roots level between soldiers and civilians. As I have previously noted, fewer and fewer Americans have a significant tie to the military. While the military does make certain nominal efforts to increase this understanding, they do not go nearly far enough.⁹⁹ If communication between civilians and military is to be enhanced at the grass-roots level, then

⁹⁹ An example of the military's attempted outreach to local civilians would be the policy found at Fort Campbell. Here, the division commander posted a firepower demonstration for local civilian leaders on a quarterly basis. This gathering gave him the opportunity to discuss current issues with surrounding civilian leadership on an informal basis. However, this approach is much closer to the fusionist theory discussed at the higher levels of civil-military relations than it is to the grass-roots interaction that I advocate. This effort can be placed in stark contrast to another policy that the military had in effect at the same time. For all soldiers on Fort Campbell it was forbidden to conduct all but the most minimal of business in their daily uniform, the battle dress uniform. Soldiers were allowed to get gas or make a purchase at a quick stop store. They were not allowed to rent a movie or purchase groceries while in their daily work uniform.

certain steps will have to be taken on the part of both sides. However, the majority of the burden lies with the military and civilian elites who control the military. The only way to successfully achieve fusionist goals is to embrace very different policies and accepted norms than those that currently exist.

Much has been made of the military's conservatism and its inability to reflect societal norms.¹⁰⁰ This can only be changed through education. Up to this point, the military has successfully resisted a departure from conservatism because they have been able to shield themselves from the viable arguments of the opposition and to resist exposure to situations that support these arguments. Throughout the Cold War, the specter of the Soviet Union made security the paramount concern. This threat is now gone, but rather than change, the military has taken to substituting other threats.

Another possible reason that the military resists more interaction with the grassroots civilian population is for fear that some of the press that they receive will inevitably be negative. This fear stems from the new zero defect mentality that the military has embraced. Up to this point, the military has enjoyed one of the highest approval ratings of any institution in America, second perhaps only to the church. With increased interaction at the grassroots level there will inevitably come a certain amount of bad press. Because of the current zero-defect mentality that is prevalent throughout the military, even small short-term mistakes within the framework of successful long-range policy can be fatal. For this reason military officers are hesitant to try anything which may produce even a small degree of short-term downside.

¹⁰⁰ See for Example Ricks, *The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society* or Dunlap, *The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012*.

On the part of grassroots civilians, there is only one significant change that needs to be made. They have to accept the military with an open mind, and avoid, as much as possible, stereotypical mind-sets. They will have to make efforts to integrate the military into all those organizations that comprise civil society. But the biggest challenge before them is to gain a more comprehensive understanding of national security issues, and the trade-offs between civil liberties and security.

On the part of the military, efforts must be made to increase interaction with society on all fronts as much as possible within what security allows. Certain security concerns are valid, and must be addressed. However, the military must initiate a wholesale move toward societal thinking, especially with regards to rewarding initiative and redesigning organizational structures in the information age. Additionally, it must be recognized that this policy will not work perfectly and that there is inevitable friction that will result from the changes. As the policy currently stands the military is much too conservative in this area, resulting in a policy that may likely be doing more harm than good. The transformation of large organizations is always difficult, but in this case the rewards far outweigh the risks.

First, the military needs to gain the support of the civilian elites who are the ultimate approval authority for all major shifts in policy. As we well know, it is the government that controls the military, and they ultimately make the decisions about how the military will be allowed to conduct themselves. An example of an excellent vehicle for the military to accomplish this goal is to continue with their congressional fellowship program. This is a program where military officers serve as trip coordinators for congresspersons. They are responsible for planning all aspects of the international travel, and actually accompany these elected representatives on the trips. This allows for significant and meaningful interaction

between congress people and the military, resulting in each having a better understanding of the others' views. While critics argue that this is a drain on military manpower, and does nothing to support the military's mission, they cannot deny that valuable communication is taking place between military and civil elites. It is programs like this that must be encouraged if communication between these two groups is to be increased.

The military can attack this problem on two fronts. First they must increase their interaction with grassroots civilians. Secondly they must establish a more overt presence in society. The easiest change that the military can make is to institute proactive reform with regards to the wearing of military uniforms in public. I'm not suggesting that members of the military be allowed to conduct business in public while wearing a dirty and disheveled uniform or that soldiers in uniform be allowed to drink in bars during what would be considered normal duty hours. However, there is no reason for soldiers who are in a clean and presentable duty uniform to not be allowed out on the local economy. Allowing soldiers to conduct business in uniform highlights the economic contributions of the military to the local economy and presents an opportunity for discussions and civil-military interaction to occur. By not allowing soldiers to wear their normal duty uniform off post, the military only sends a message to both society and soldiers. Soldiers should be embarrassed about being in the military. The ultimate result of the current policy is that it is more convenient for soldiers to remain on post to take care of their shopping needs. An excellent opportunity for interaction and appreciation between society and military is lost.

The second, and more challenging part of the military's transformation is to do away with many of the on-post amenities that soldiers currently enjoy. This will entail a much greater cost financially, but the benefits are well worth it. Certain facilities such as

gymnasiums and small shops will have to remain on post, as it only makes sense because they are used by soldiers during the duty day, and because gymnasiums are vital to soldiers performing their missions. The majority of the facilities such as most churches, commissaries, post exchanges, golf courses, schools and housing should eventually be phased out. While all of these facilities are extremely convenient for the military, they have a very detrimental effect of intensely isolating the military from the surrounding civilian community.

Additional steps that can be taken by the military to heighten their interaction with the civilian community are to increase relationships between the two. This could take the form of increasing military enrollment in institutions of higher education. The military's traditionally conservative values have been highly lamented in recent times. However, this should not come as a surprise to anyone who examines the current structure of the military. Much of the learning that is accomplished by younger members in the military is from more senior officers. It is virtually impossible to change the mindset of someone unless they can be exposed to the other side of an argument.

Communication on Campus

An additional challenge facing the military is for them to become more reflective of society. This problem has developed through the years as the military went to an all-volunteer force. In this case, one of the best ways to increase understanding and foster liberalism within the military is to have them spend time in some of the bastions of liberal thinking, American colleges. This will cost the military more money. However, the price of failing to act on policies such as this may in fact be even higher. This serves two purposes,

first it exposes the military to a more balanced approach, and second, it provides yet another conduit for communication between society and the military.

A major challenge to increasing interaction between the two groups has been a response of liberal educational institutions to military policies with which they disagree. The typical course of action of an educational institution that disagrees with the military policy is for them to ban the military from their campus. This does not help the military to become an institution more reflective of society, but rather drives them into a more conservative way of thinking. The only way to develop a more liberal mindset in the military is for the military's members to think more liberally. Liberal thought processes are not developed at conservative institutions of higher education, but rather at liberal ones. Decreasing the amount of contact between conservative members of the military and liberal thinkers within higher educational institutions does nothing to improve the open-mindedness of the military.

The conclusion one must draw is that campuses must reopen their gates to the military's Reserve Officer Training Corps program in order to better infuse the military with the same spectrum of thought that is found in society. Society cannot hold the military solely responsible for their conservatism if, by their actions, they're forcing the military into it. Additionally, the military should consider increasing the number of senior officers that they send to college for additional education. Ultimately, interaction between these two groups is the only way to increase understanding, and may well work to draw the military mindset towards the mainstream of American thinking.

Civil-Military Interaction in the Community

An excellent example of a program that fosters communication between the military and civilians is the military's Foxholes to Classrooms program of the early '90s. With this

program the government paid for the education which converted soldiers into teachers and subsidized the salary of these teachers when they were hired by a school system. This served to virtually ensure that jobs were available for soldiers with a transition back into society. Additionally, it met the needs of society that was at the time experiencing a shortage of teachers. This is the kind of proactive program that the military needs to pursue.¹⁰¹

Another policy that the military could take up is to return to the policy of a leave of absence. Prior to World War II, military officers were allowed to take time off from their career and go out and explore other pursuits. They could then return to the military and pick up their career where it had left off. I will not debate the merits of that policy at that time, however I would like to highlight some of its value to the modern-day military. By allowing easier transition between the military and society, the military will enjoy an increase in communication, which serves two vital purposes. First, it allows the military to communicate more effectively, and establish stronger ties with society. Secondly, it provides the military with another source of innovation. By exposing officers to innovation in an unbiased environment, the military is able to increase its intellectual capital. Both of these results are beneficial to the military in the long run. Critics will claim that the military profession is so intense that a professional officer cannot afford to take time off from the study of the profession. However, the benefits of a more multi-disciplined approach cannot be denied, especially in light of the new threats on the horizon. The Military is moving toward a commercial model for their organization. It may be extremely enlightening for military officers to examine the relationship that large technology companies have with each

¹⁰¹ As a company commander in the military, I had several soldiers take advantage of this program in 1994 -1995.

other (such as Intel, Microsoft, Dell and Cisco), and determine which lessons learned about their relationship might likewise apply to the different branches of service.

As has been previously discussed, the amount of knowledge the military officer ought to know has grown increasingly diverse. No longer can a military professional consider himself prepared for battle by only studying tactics. In today's modern security environment many excellent ideas are coming from both science and business. An example would be to consider Dell's model of just in time inventories and how the military has adapted it to its own logistical concerns. Essentially, just in time inventories seek to minimize the amount of logistics waiting for an event to occur. Rather, as soon as a company determines that an event will occur, they order precisely those items required to meet the needs of the event. This serves to reduce the amount of logistics maintained on hand and also to ensure that no shipping is wasted on items that are not needed. The military is now using the same concept to reduce its logistical tail. Rather than ordering unneeded parts, ammunition and food and then hauling them around until they are needed, the military is able to minimize excess items and carry only those things that they truly need, thereby significantly reducing their logistical trail. This is only one example of the benefits that can be derived from a close and open interaction between business and the military.

A significant benefit of a leave of absence comes into play when a military officer is actually serving in an enterprise outside of the military. It is at this time that the most productive dialogue occurs between the military and society. Additionally, the environment is most conducive to creativity for the officer and is very heavily laden with new concepts that he can take back to the military and apply. All of this contributes to the diversity of the

officer's education, something that will be increasingly helpful in the new security environment.

One important benefit that the military would gain is a new perspective on organizational structure. As previously discussed, Janowitz argues effectively that the introduction of high technology into the military has created the need for the military to get away from authoritarian leadership. Janowitz recognizes that an important element of power lies with each individual member of the military team. Because of this he argues that the military has been slowly shifting from authoritarian domination to an approach that focuses more on persuasion and group consensus.¹⁰²

An additional implication of this change in command style and empowerment of the individual is the need for a different command structure.¹⁰³ Army publications have noted for some time that there is an increase in the amount of information that an individual on the battlefield can collect.¹⁰⁴ By one estimate, a lieutenant on today's modern battlefield has more battlespace awareness than a general had in World War II. The implication of this increased knowledge is that individuals can act more quickly and with greater confidence. However, in order for this to work well the military must discard its current command structure in favor of one that is less vertical. As Janowitz has noted, the young men from society who joined the military are already accustomed to this new style of decision-making. If the military is to succeed in responding to their future challenges, they must recognize this societal imperative and modify their own organizational structure in response. Because

¹⁰² Janowitz, page 8 – 9.

¹⁰³ For a revolutionary approach to the issue of altering the United States Army's command structure see McGregor, *Breaking the Phalanx*.

¹⁰⁴ TRADOC Pam 525-5.

today's modern military involves less and less personal contact and more and more communications through electronic media, military officers can no longer rely on authoritarian leadership. Instead, they must devise a new command structure that relies more on individual initiative and empowerment.

The Military's Elitist Mentality

There is a popular notion of the service member being somewhat of a Paladin. This thought is often encouraged by the military. They point to low pay and argue that they serve not for monetary gain, but rather for duty. While this is true to a certain degree, it is not necessarily beneficial for military service members to see themselves as better than the society for that they serve. Tom Wolfe, in 1985, told the Corps of cadets at West Point that they were "the guardians at the gate of the bacchanal".¹⁰⁵ This kind of thinking promotes a certain unhealthy disdain amongst the military for the society which they are sworn to protect. If the military is to become more reflective of society in their thinking, then they will have to abandon, to a large degree, this elitist mentality.¹⁰⁶

The military needs to acknowledge that the solutions to some of the new challenges in its profession are becoming more multidisciplinary, and that it may be helpful to have a more multidiscipline leadership. This can be accomplished with some creative solutions. First, the military needs to get rid of its zero defect mentality. The current promotion system within the military allows for no risk taking, because any mistake can potentially be fatal in the

¹⁰⁵ Tom Wolfe, Distinguished Lecturer Series, West Point, New York, 1985.

¹⁰⁶ The civil-military literature contains a wide variety of examples of this kind of thought, ranging from surveys of the youngest recruits to surveys of military officers attending some of the highest levels of education. For example, see "The Widening Gap Between the U.S. Military and U.S. Society" by Thomas E. Ricks or see Peter D. fevers work at the Triangle Institute for Security Studies "Project on the Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society; Digest of Findings and Studies".

current model. A better system would allow for a certain degree of risk taking on the part of younger officers and therefore provide a certain degree of creativity in more senior officers.

Secondly, they need to consider the sessions for businessmen later in their career.

Ultimately, this policy brings the two institutions closer together for two reasons. First, it provides an additional channel for dialog about national security issues. Regardless of how the channel is created, additional communication is, in and of itself, a valuable trait.

Secondly, it provides the military an additional tool to modify their mentality. Ultimately, if the military is to continue to do their job, they will have to change their organizational mindset to something that more closely resembles that of society.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

After having looked at the current state of American civil-military relations, the newly emerging threats that have surfaced, and the current status of the military, change is clearly necessary. A proactive approach is called for to meet the challenge of maintaining a viable balance between the military and society in the coming century. While many have recognized certain aspects of the issue, at this point there does not seem to be a realization of the actual status of civil-military affairs. Rosenau has argued that we are in the most turbulent times of world history since Westphalia. If we couple this with a military officer corps that is becoming more isolated from society and at the same time much more conservative than society, then we must accept that a proactive approach is called for in dealing with civil-military affairs.

The emerging security environment has dictated that American military officers become more politically astute. A byproduct of this additional dimension is the other thought the manifestation of their warrior ethic in their political beliefs. The conservatism traditionally identified with the military mind is now evident in the politics of the officer corps. Steps must be taken to stem this trend among military officers, and to make them more reflective of the society that they defend. If we are to bring the officer corps more in line with society, then we must change, to a certain degree, their source of education. Additionally, the new spectrum of threats poses additional challenges. Security is no longer as simple as physically defending one's borders. On the contrary, the complexity of security

almost guarantees that it will be more difficult to provide. This necessitates an increase communication between society and the military.

Another byproduct of this new information age is the empowerment of individuals. As individuals become empowered, a natural conflict will arise in the area of civil liberties. The military will want to curtail, to the extent that they can be harmful, civil liberties of the individual. On the other hand, individuals who have enjoyed these freedoms up until now will likely resist their loss. This will result in an almost inevitable trade-off, as national security and civil liberties are at odds with each other.

Because increasing communication between society in the military is the only solution to decreasing the isolation that each feels from the other, certain measures must be taken. The military must take whatever steps possible in order to increase its interaction with surrounding communities. This means that they must get rid of many of the vestiges of the Cold War. While certain facilities will have to be maintained on military bases, many can be done away with. Local communities can fill the gap with regards to many shopping and recreational services that the military now provides. For the most part, military housing can also be done away with over the long run. Even though all of these solutions entail an increase in the military budget, the alternative of an isolated and uncommunicative military is much worse.

The military must work to change the part of their culture that promotes separateness. Even though team building is an important aspect of military culture, it must be subordinate to an understanding of equality and oneness with society. The military must re-establish its presence on college campuses. Without a broader spectrum of views provided to military officers through their education, changing their political orientation will prove to be a

difficult task. Additionally, this lack of broad orientation may well hinder them in ensuring their ability to provide security in the future environment.

Ultimately, both the military and society must recognize that new rules apply. They must take advantage of the empowerment of the individual, in how they structure both organizations and relationships. This empowerment suggests that communication between the two groups may grow easier, but little evidence of this trend exists as of yet. However, one thing is very clear. In a world that changes rapidly, a proactive approach is the only hope for maintaining a strong and healthy relationship between society and the military.

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